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I. Introduction
Income from employment (FICA)1 and self-employment
(SECA)2 taxes represents more than one-third of annual federal
1. See Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128
(2012) (describing employment taxes (sometimes called “payroll taxes”), which
are paid by employers and employees based on employees’ wages).
2. See Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA), I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403
(2012) (describing self-employment taxes, which are paid by self-employed
individuals on their net income from self-employment).
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revenue.3 Likewise, Social Security and Medicare—the social
insurance programs that these taxes support—account for more
than one-third of all federal government spending each year.4 The
government expects Medicare and Social Security expenditures to
rise at an accelerated clip in the coming decades due to
demographic changes and increasing health care costs.5
Expenditures on these programs already exceed annual revenue
from employment and self-employment taxes,6 and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the deficits will
worsen.7 While our country undoubtedly needs broader policy
changes to address those deficits, there is no reason to neglect
opportunities to maximize employment and self-employment tax
revenues by effectively enforcing existing tax law until those
changes arrive.
Because the employment tax regime targets wages arising
from formal employer–employee relationships and utilizes a

3. See Tax Policy Ctr. (Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst.), TPC Tax Topics:
Payroll Taxes, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/
Payroll-Taxes.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that FICA and SECA
taxes accounted for 34.5% of all federal revenue in 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). FICA taxes produce the vast majority of this
revenue, generating more than 30% of federal revenue in 2011 compared with
approximately 2% from SECA taxes. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4168, THE
TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 1 (2012)
[hereinafter CBO SECA REPORT]. This ratio “closely reflects” the ratio of wage
earners to self-employed individuals. Id.
4. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO
OUR FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS GO? 1 (2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-1408tax.pdf (providing spending figures for fiscal year 2012).
5. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4507, THE 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET
OUTLOOK 12–13, 45, 65 (2012) (projecting increases in expenditures due to rising
health care costs and increases in the number of beneficiaries as baby boomers
age).
6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4520, THE 2012 LONG-TERM
PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1 (2012) (“In 2011,
[Social Security] outlays exceeded tax revenues by 4 percent, and CBO projects
that the gap will average about 10 percent of tax revenues over the next
decade.”).
7. See Soc. Sec. & Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2013 Annual
Reports, U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/index.html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (reporting revenues and expenditures for Social
Security and Medicare in recent years and projecting deficits over the next
several decades) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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structured, uniform withholding system, it is easier to enforce.8
Because the self-employment tax regime operates outside of a
formal wage system, its tax base is more porous. That is,
characterization of income may allow taxpayers to shield the
return on self-employed labor from the SECA base.9 The CBO
estimates that the self-employment tax base captures
approximately three-fourths of the income that would be taxed if
those workers were subject to the FICA tax regime.10
Income generated through partnerships and other
unincorporated business entities such as limited liability
companies (LLCs) and limited liability partnerships (LLPs)
presents particular self-employment tax enforcement challenges.
Because Congress and the Treasury Department have failed to
update certain tax laws and regulations to address the evolution
of the unincorporated business entity landscape over the past
three decades, income that arguably should be part of the selfemployment tax base eludes taxation.11 Service-providing
professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and accountants, who
often organize their businesses as unincorporated entities, can
exploit these rules, essentially permitting those taxpayers to elect
out of the self-employment tax regime through choice of entity
and ownership structure.12
8. See Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper—Reflections on the
Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, 93–96 (2000) (comparing the
employment and self-employment tax systems and noting differences that make
employment taxes easier to collect).
9. See id. at 96 (noting that the taxpayer alone controls classification of
income as subject to self-employment tax, which creates a “greater potential” for
understatement of self-employment income and underpayment of selfemployment taxes); see also Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment
Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 127 (2009) (noting that the law permits
individuals who conduct their business through an unincorporated entity to
“artificially exclude from the employment tax base amounts that would
otherwise be included if they operated as a sole proprietor”).
10. CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at iv.
11. See infra Part III (explaining how the self-employment tax base fails to
capture all labor income due to the nature of unincorporated businesses); infra
Part IV.E (describing the problems presented by the changes to the
unincorporated business landscape).
12. See CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (describing how differences
in the FICA and SECA tax regimes can “affect an individual’s decision about
whether to be self-employed” and “influence the choice of how to organize a
firm”); see also Winchester, supra note 9, at 128 (“Depending on the business
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Internal Revenue Code § 1402(a)(13),13 which excludes from
the self-employment tax base the distributive share of any
“limited partner” (less guaranteed payments for services
rendered),14 represents one such loophole-creating rule and is the
focus of this Note. Some unincorporated business owners now
exploit the limited partner exclusion—originally enacted to
prevent taxpayers from obtaining Social Security benefits
improperly by paying self-employment taxes15—to avoid paying
the tax.16 Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury
Regulations define “limited partner” or provide guidance on how
to apply this provision to modern unincorporated businesses that
no longer neatly fit within the 1977 limited partnership
framework.17
Part II of this Note lays the foundation for analyzing this
problem by discussing the history of Social Security and Medicare
and of the employment and self-employment tax regimes.18 This
Part also discusses how the legislative history of the Social
Security Act of 193519 reveals several policy choices that have
shaped the development of both the Social Security program and
the tax regimes that finance it.20 Part III explains why one of
these policy choices—the decision to fund Social Security through

entity that she uses, a self-employed individual can substantially reduce her
employment tax liability and often eliminate it entirely.”).
13. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2012).
14. See id. (“[T]here shall be excluded the distributive share of any item of
income or loss of a limited partner . . . other than guaranteed payments . . . to
that partner for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the partnership to
the extent that those payments are . . . remuneration for those services.”).
15. See infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’s
motivation to enact the limited partner exclusion).
16. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUB. NO. JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 98–99 (2005) (“The
uncertainty in treatment creates an opportunity for abuse by taxpayers willing
to make the argument that they are not subject to any employment tax (FICA or
self-employment), even though this argument is contrary to the spirit and intent
of the employment tax rules.”).
17. Infra note 153 and accompanying text.
18. Infra Part II.
19. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat.
620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
20. Infra Part II.A.
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a contributory tax on labor income—presents special challenges
in the unincorporated business context.21
Part IV discusses the limited partner exclusion, explaining
both the impetus for its enactment and Congress’s rationale for
using limited partners as a dividing line to separate labor income
and capital income.22 This Part also puts § 1402(a)(13) in context
by describing the unincorporated business landscape as Congress
viewed it in 1977 and chronicling the ways the business
landscape has changed.23 These changes, especially the
proliferation of LLCs (whose owners are neither “general
partners” nor “limited partners” under state law), have created
uncertainty for taxpayers and produced numerous problems
applying the exclusion.24 This Part also describes the Internal
Revenue Service’s (IRS) mechanical interpretation of
§ 1402(a)(13)—affirmed by courts through the years—that
classification as a “general partner” or “limited partner” for
§ 1402(a)(13) purposes depends only on one’s classification under
state law.25
Part V focuses on the IRS’s attempts to address these
problems by proposing regulations in the mid-1990s26 and
explains how Congress eventually thwarted these problemsolving attempts by enacting a regulatory moratorium in 1997.27
Part VI discusses the 2011 Tax Court case of Renkemeyer,
Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner,28 which exemplifies
the potential for abuse created by the lack of definitive guidance
on how to apply the limited partner exclusion to unincorporated
business entities other than limited partnerships.29 Renkemeyer
21. See infra Part III (discussing difficulties in separating labor income and
capital income).
22. Infra Part IV.A–B.
23. See infra Part IV.B (describing the business landscape in 1977); infra
Part IV.D (describing the evolution of unincorporated business entities since
1977).
24. See infra Part IV.E (describing these problems).
25. See infra Part IV.C (discussing cases decided using this standard).
26. Infra Part V.A–B.
27. Infra Part V.C.
28. 136 T.C. 137 (2011).
29. Infra Part VI.A (explaining the taxpayer’s aggressive position and the
Tax Court’s response).
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garnered attention from tax practitioners—not so much for its
result, but rather for the Tax Court’s reasoning in reaching the
result.30 The court gave little weight to precedent that would have
easily decided the case and instead focused on the partners’ level
of participation to determine whether they qualified as limited
partners.31 The court’s rationale left practitioners wondering if
material participation is the new dividing line—one that may
jeopardize the ability of some state-law-designated limited
partners to utilize the exclusion.32
In Part VII, this Note advocates for adoption of a material
participation standard to interpret the limited partner exclusion,
noting the limitations of this approach.33 Part VIII concludes this
Note by discussing possible mechanisms for adopting such a
standard.34
II. Historical Foundations of the Self-Employment Tax
A. Landmark Legislation: Social Security Act of 1935
To appreciate the current dilemma regarding exclusion or
inclusion of income for self-employment tax purposes, it is helpful
to understand the basic history of the social insurance programs
funded by employment and self-employment tax revenue. FICA
and SECA taxes provide the majority of funding for three
programs: (1) the Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance program,
which provides cash benefits to retired workers and surviving
dependents of deceased workers; (2) the Disability Insurance
program, which provides cash benefits to disabled workers and
their dependents; and (3) Hospital Insurance, which funds health
insurance benefits popularly known as Medicare.35

30. See infra Part VI.B (describing reactions to Renkemeyer).
31. See infra notes 289–301 and accompanying text (describing the court’s
analysis).
32. See infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text (describing this
concern).
33. Infra Part VII.
34. Infra Part VIII.
35. Dilley, supra note 8, at 65 & n.2, 69.
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Responding to growing concern about income insecurity
following the Great Depression,36 Congress enacted the Social
Security Act37 in 1935, which established Social Security, the
cash benefits program for retired workers.38 Social Security was
not the first federal program to provide direct assistance to
citizens and their families,39 but it was the first program to utilize
a social insurance approach.40 Rather than obtaining benefit
eligibility by demonstrating financial need, individuals gained
eligibility for Social Security (and later, Medicare) benefits by
working in employment covered by the Social Security Act41 and
by making contributions to the Social Security program.42 Cash
benefit amounts are not formally means-tested;43 instead the
36. See Lawrence H. Thompson & Melinda M. Upp, The Social Insurance
Approach and Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 3–4
(Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds. 1997) (explaining the need for Social
Security).
37. Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat.
620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Although the
Act passed in 1935, the government did not begin collecting payroll taxes until
1937 and did not begin disbursing benefits until 1942. Martha A. McSteen, Fifty
Years of Social Security, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. SOC. SECURITY HIST.,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/50mm2.html (last visited Nov, 4, 2013) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. See 49 Stat. at 620 (describing the Act’s purposes, including “[t]o
provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age
benefits”); see also DENNIS W. JOHNSON, THE LAWS THAT SHAPED AMERICA:
FIFTEEN ACTS OF CONGRESS AND THEIR LASTING IMPACT 176–77 (2009) (describing
the components of the Social Security Act of 1935).
39. See JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 178 (describing the public’s familiarity
with federal assistance programs).
40. See Thompson & Upp, supra note 36, at 4–6 (providing historical
context to Congress’s choice to build Social Security on a social insurance
model).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2012) (stating that forty quarters of
qualifying work establishes basic eligibility for lifetime benefits). For a quarter
to qualify, the worker must earn a certain amount, set by the government each
year, based on average total covered wages. Id. § 413(d)(2). For the 2013 tax
year, a worker who earns $1,160 in one quarter receives one credit. SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2013 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES 1 (2012), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2013.htm.
42. See Thompson & Upp, supra note 36, at 7 (“Eligibility for benefits
under social insurance programs [such as Social Security] rests, in part, on
current or previous contributions by the individual, the individual’s employer, or
both.”).
43. See id. at 10 (explaining that means-tested programs such as food
stamps and Medicaid pay benefits “to claimants who first demonstrate limited
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program calculates benefit amounts using a percentage of a
worker’s lifetime average earnings.44 This structure—tying work
to benefits—distinguished Social Security from other social
programs.
Although Social Security initially covered only workers in
“commerce and industry,” which included approximately 60% of
jobs at that time,45 President Franklin D. Roosevelt favored
including all Americans in the program from the start.46 Aside
from his desire to protect all Americans from the dangers of
income insecurity, President Roosevelt recognized that without
compulsory, universal participation and coverage, the program
would not be able to generate enough revenue to cover its
obligations.47
Working toward this universal coverage goal, Social Security
coverage expanded over the next two decades, adding survivors of
deceased workers,48 previously excluded wage-earning workers,49
economic resources” and typically have “nothing to do with prior earnings or
payment of taxes”). Social Security benefits are, however, indirectly meanstested in that only a portion of higher income individuals’ benefits are excluded
from gross income. See I.R.C. § 86 (2012) (describing taxation of Social Security
benefits). Through the income tax, higher income beneficiaries return a portion
of their benefits to the government.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (providing the benefit determination formula). The
benefit determination formula, however, is “weighted to provide a higher level of
replacement of prior earnings for low earners.” Dilley, supra note 8, at 69 n.15.
Although Medicare eligibility also requires forty quarters of qualifying
employment, medical costs—not prior earnings—determine Medicare benefit
amounts. See id. (noting this difference).
45. LARRY W. DEWITT, DANIEL BÉLAND & EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL
SECURITY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4 (2008).
46. See JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 183 (noting a statement made by
President Roosevelt in a cabinet meeting during the early stages of planning the
new program that would become Social Security).
47. See Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz, Should Social Security be
Means-Tested?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 36, at 41,
43–44 (describing problems that would result if taxpayers could “opt-out” of the
Social Security program).
48. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53
Stat. 1360 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1306–1307 (2012)) (adding survivor
benefits).
49. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64
Stat. 477 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 411–418, 1308, 1351–1355 (2012)) (expanding
coverage to wage-earning farm and domestic workers and some federal
government workers).
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disabled citizens who could not work,50 and the self-employed.51
Congress introduced the Hospital Insurance (HI) program in
1964.52
B. Funding Social Security: Affirming the Tie Between Benefits
and Labor
Like the universal coverage goal, the commitment to tying
benefits to a person’s work played a vital role in Social Security’s
creation and still drives the program’s financing structure today.
In discussions leading to the Social Security Act’s enactment,
President Roosevelt emphasized that Social Security should be a
form of social insurance, not welfare, as “[w]elfare, then and now,
carried negative connotations; insurance did not.”53 He noted that
“[u]nder an insurance program, work and savings are
encouraged, and individuals would not be on the dreaded ‘dole.’”54
J. Douglas Brown, a Princeton University professor who chaired
the first Advisory Council on Social Security (assembled by
President Roosevelt to design Social Security),55 found it both
“politically and psychologically reasonable” to limit eligibility for
benefits to workers who contributed into the system.56 The
benefits–labor connection, Brown said, gave contributing workers
“a broad equity in a system—a sense of right—that for the
50. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat.
807 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (adding disability
benefits); see also JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 177 (“In 1956, Congress
incorporated disability insurance and later created SSI, the Supplemental
Security Income program for the indigent aged not eligible for regular Social
Security benefits.”).
51. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64
Stat. 477 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 411–418, 1308, 1351–1355 (2012)) (extending
coverage to nonfarm, nonprofessional, self-employed individuals); Social
Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, 68 Stat. 1052 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 176, 420–422 (2012)) (extending coverage to self-employed farmers
and most self-employed professionals).
52. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat.
286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (adding Medicare).
53. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 184.
54. Id.
55. See J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY viii (1977)
(describing his service on the Advisory Council).
56. Id. at 26.
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contributor distinguished benefits from relief.”57 Affirming
President Roosevelt’s thinking, Brown agreed that a social
insurance program based on work would earn greater popular
and political appeal than a welfare system because it was
“individualized” and “suited the American mores of paying for
one’s own ticket.”58
Believing it wrong to “saddle future generations with
expenditures accrued in the 1940s,” President Roosevelt
demanded that Social Security be entirely self-financing and
favored a payroll tax on wages over general revenues.59 Congress
ultimately sided with President Roosevelt and chose a payroll tax
on wages over an increase in the general income tax for several
reasons. First, payroll taxes would supply a revenue source
independent of income and other taxes.60 Next, Congress viewed
the general income tax as an “uncertain means of collecting
money for social projects.”61 At the time, the income tax had a
narrow base—95% of Americans paid no income taxes—which
limited its expansion potential and made it “unreliable” for
covering Social Security’s future obligations.62 Most important, a
wage tax reinforced the program’s labor–benefits link.
Social Security’s architects believed that financing the
program through a payroll tax had political as well as practical
expediency in that workers would “enthusiastically buy into the
idea that it was their money that went in and their money that
would be available at retirement time.”63 Further, as President
Roosevelt put it, a wage tax would “give the contributors a legal,
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. DEWITT ET AL., supra note 45, at 3; see also SHEILA BURKE, ERIC KINGSON
& UWE REINHARDT, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE
RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 38 (2000) (“The self-financing feature of the program,
first proposed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1935, became another of its celebrated
virtues.”).
60. See Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social
Security in the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 36, at 22, 24 (noting this characteristic).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 186. Note that an individual’s earnings
recorded—not taxes paid—determine Social Security benefit amounts. See 42
U.S.C. § 415 (2012) (providing the formulas for computing benefit amounts).
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moral, and political right to collect their pensions,” having
already paid taxes into the system.64 This right would safeguard
the benefits from any future politicians’ attempts to scrap Social
Security.65
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act66 authorized the
payroll tax, splitting the nominal tax liability evenly between
employers and employees.67 The wage tax provided an easy way
to identify labor income because wages represent labor “being
exchanged in an employer-employee setting.”68 Likewise, the
payroll tax withholding system made eligibility and benefit
record keeping administratively convenient69 and made the tax
“relatively easy to implement and enforce.”70
Incorporating self-employed individuals into Social Security
required a new taxation system because self-employed people, by
definition, did not receive wages or have an employer with whom
to share contribution responsibilities.71 Further, covering the selfemployed presented administrative difficulties because the FICA
withholding system could not be replicated in the selfemployment context.72 Additionally, self-employed earnings did
not have the same “labor income only” quality as wages.73 Despite
these differences, Congress desired “[t]o place the self-employed
on a comparable basis with wage earners,”74 meaning that the

64. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 186.
65. See id. (quoting President Roosevelt as saying, “With those taxes in
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program”).
66. I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012).
67. See id. § 3101 (employee portion); id. § 3111 (employer portion).
68. Dilley, supra note 8, at 71.
69. See id. at 93–94 (describing the FICA system’s convenience as both a
revenue-collection and benefit-accrual device). Note that employers—not
employees—collect FICA taxes and pay them to the government. See I.R.C.
§ 3102(a) (“The tax . . . shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, by
deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid.”).
70. Dilley, supra note 8, at 71.
71. See id. at 74 (describing reasons why Congress could not simply
incorporate self-employed individuals into the FICA system).
72. See id. at 94 (“The convenience of the payroll tax withholding system is
replaced by the difficulties of assessing a wage tax where there is no payroll.”).
73. See infra notes 117–25 and accompanying text (explaining how the
self-employment tax base captures both labor income and returns on capital).
74. S. REP. NO. 81-1669, at 3318 (1950).
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self-employment tax system would share the FICA system’s goal
of taxing compensation for labor.75
Instinctively, Congress attempted to replicate the FICA tax
model in the self-employment realm. This effort produced the
self-employment tax—an income tax that Congress hoped would
behave like a wage tax.76 Section 1401 of the Internal Revenue
Code77 states that taxes “shall be imposed for each taxable year,
on the self-employment income of every individual.”78 The Code
imposes self-employment taxes only on “net earnings from selfemployment,”79 which § 1402 defines as
the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or
business carried on by such individual, less the deductions
allowed . . . which are attributable to such trade or business,
plus his distributive share (whether or not distributed) of
income or loss . . . from any trade or business carried on by a
partnership of which he is a member.80

The section excludes several income categories from net earnings
from self-employment, including: net income from rental
properties (except for real estate dealers);81 dividend and interest
income (except for securities dealers);82 and gains or losses from
the sale or exchange of capital assets.83 Because Congress wanted
the self-employment tax base to parallel the FICA system’s labor
income base, Congress excluded these archetypal categories of
capital income from the start.84
75. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 74 (“Nonetheless, Congress determined that
the self-employed must be taxed on a basis comparable to that of employers and
employees—that is, ‘on remuneration received for one’s own labor.’”).
76. See id. at 93 (characterizing the self-employment tax as an income tax
that “is required to perform like a wage tax”).
77. I.R.C. § 1401 (2012).
78. Id.
79. See CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (“[T]he SECA tax base is the
net business income (that is, receipts minus expenses) for self-employed
workers.”).
80. I.R.C. § 1402(a).
81. Id. § 1402(a)(1).
82. Id. § 1402(a)(2).
83. Id. § 1402(a)(3)(A)–(C).
84. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 78 (“Given the policy requirement that
Social Security taxes be imposed generally on earnings from labor, as opposed to
investment income, dividends and interest income are predictably excluded . . .
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The first self-employment tax applied a 2.25% tax to a
taxpayer’s net income from self-employment.85 This rate
represented the full employee’s share of the FICA tax at the time
(1.5%) plus an estimate of the after-tax employer’s share
(0.75%).86 Self-employed individuals paid the tax through their
income tax returns and could not deduct any portion of the selfemployment taxes they paid.87
C. Current Structure of Social Insurance Financing
The self-employment tax’s structure evolved over the next
thirty years, becoming more parallel to the FICA tax regime.
Today, self-employed individuals pay a 15.3% SECA tax, equaling
both the employer and employee portions of the FICA tax.88
Section 164(f)89 permits self-employed individuals to deduct onehalf of their self-employment tax liability as a business expense
(just as the employer’s portion of the FICA tax is not included in
an employee’s gross income).90 To achieve full parity with the
FICA system, self-employed taxpayers may reduce their selfemployment tax base by an amount equivalent to one-half of their
self-employment tax liability before computing the § 164(f)
deduction.91

as such income is not analogous to employee wages.”).
85. Berkowitz, supra note 60, at 25.
86. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that Congress intended this
percentage to “represent the full employee’s share plus a rough estimate of the
after-tax employer’s share of the tax”).
87. Id.
88. See I.R.C. § 1401(a)–(b) (2012) (providing the SECA rate and describing
how it is allocated); see also Dilley, supra note 8, at 74–75 (explaining that
Congress revised the SECA tax structure to “require self-employed persons to
pay, in effect, ‘both halves’ of the employer and employee shares of Social
Security taxes”).
89. I.R.C. § 164(f).
90. See id. (providing for the deduction); see also Dilley, supra note 8, at
75–76 (explaining the need for the § 164(f) and § 1402(a)(12) deductions given
Congress’s goal of putting the self-employed worker “in roughly the same
position as an employee after income and FICA taxes are imposed on wage
income” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-47, at 126 (1983) (Conf. Rep))).
91. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(12) (providing for this deduction).
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The 15.3% tax rate allocates 12.4% to the Old Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program and 2.9% to the HI
program.92 The tax’s OASDI part applies only to a portion of an
individual’s income that is capped by statute each year and
adjusted for average wage growth.93 In 2013, the OASDI tax
applied only to the first $113,700 in net earnings from selfemployment.94
The HI portion originally had a similar earnings ceiling, but
Congress removed the ceiling in 199395 in response to claims that
the HI wage ceiling provided an advantage to higher income
taxpayers. The wage cap allowed higher income taxpayers to
receive Medicare coverage by contributing a much smaller
percentage of their overall income than most other workers.96
Today, the HI tax applies to all net earnings from selfemployment, making self-employment tax liability a more
significant issue for higher income taxpayers.97
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 201098
(amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act99)
authorized two new Medicare revenue sources that took effect
January 1, 2013, and also increased the tax burden for higher
income taxpayers.100 The first, codified at Internal Revenue Code
92. Id. § 1401(a)–(b).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2012) (providing for the adjustment of the OASDI
wage base); see also CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining the wage
cap system).
94. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 4
(2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p334.pdf.
95. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
416 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 267a and various sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(eliminating the HI income ceiling).
96. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 80 (describing the rationale behind
abolishing the HI earnings ceiling).
97. See id. at 81 (discussing highly compensated self-employed individuals’
increased focus on minimizing income subject to self-employment taxes after
Congress eliminated the HI wage base).
98. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029.
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
100. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061 (imposing the net investment income tax); Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 1020
(2010) (providing for the 0.9% surtax on wages and self-employment income for
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§ 1411,101 imposes a 3.8% income tax on the lesser of: a taxpayer’s
“net investment income” (NII) or the excess, if any, of the
taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income for the taxable year
over the “threshold amount.”102 Section 1411(b) sets the threshold
amounts as follows: $250,000 for a married taxpayer filing a joint
return; $200,000 for a single taxpayer; and $125,000 for a
married taxpayer filing separately.103 NII generally includes
income from investments (such as interests and dividends)
associated with a taxpayer’s nonpassive activities and all income
from passive activities.104 Section 469105 provides the framework
for determining whether an activity is passive or nonpassive in
relation to a taxpayer.106
NII does not apply to wages or self-employment income.
Instead, the second new Medicare revenue source—the Medicare
surtax described in § 3101107—increases the HI tax rate for wages
and taxable self-employment income above the threshold amount
from 2.9% to 3.8%.108 The employee (or self-employed taxpayer)
alone bears this 0.9% surtax.109
Thus, a single taxpayer having no NII but having taxable
income of $250,000 from self-employment would pay 2.9% HI tax
higher income earners).
101. I.R.C. § 1411 (2012).
102. Id. § 1411(a)(1)(A)–(B).
103. Id. § 1411(b)(1)–(3).
104. See id. § 1411(c)(1)–(2) (explaining the income categories subject to NII
tax). The Code defines NII as the sum of the following: gross income from
interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents not derived from a trade or
business that is passive with respect to the taxpayer; other gross income of any
kind derived from a passive activity or the trade or business of trading in
financial instruments or commodities; and net income from the disposition of
property of a trade or business other than that used in a passive activity trade
or business, less allowed deductions that are allocated to that those categories of
gross income or net gain. Id.
105. I.R.C. § 469 (2012).
106. See infra Part VII.C (describing the tests set forth in § 469 for
identifying passive and nonpassive income).
107. I.R.C. § 3101.
108. See id. § 3101(b)(1)–(2) (providing for an additional 0.9% HI tax on
income over the threshold amount, increasing the HI tax rate on this income
from 2.9% to 3.8%).
109. See id. §§ 3101–3102 (increasing only the “employee share” of the HI
tax).
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on the first $200,000 and 3.8% HI tax on the remaining $50,000.
If the same taxpayer instead had $180,000 of taxable selfemployment income and $70,000 of NII, she would pay 2.9% HI
tax on the self-employment income portion ($180,000) and 3.8%
NII tax on $50,000 of her NII. A single taxpayer with $250,000 of
taxable self-employment income and $100,000 of NII would pay
2.9% HI tax on the first $200,000 of self-employment income,
3.8% HI tax on the remaining self-employment income ($50,000),
and 3.8% NII tax on all of NII ($100,000). In tandem, the
Medicare surtax and new NII tax operate to close some of the
revenue gap left by the current employment and self-employment
tax regimes.
III. Excluding Returns on Capital from the SECA Tax Base
Although the self-employment tax regime aims to include
income from labor in its tax base and exclude income from
capital, achieving this goal is not easy. While some businesses—a
babysitting service, for example—can produce income from labor
alone, many businesses subject to self-employment taxes
generate income using both labor and capital investments.110 For
these businesses, accurately identifying and separating income
derived from capital and income derived from labor with precision
is difficult, if not impossible.111
Consider a landscaping business operated as a sole
proprietorship. To generate revenue, the business requires both
the owner’s investment in tangible capital assets—equipment
such as mowers, tools, perhaps a truck and trailer—and the
owner’s personal labor.112 Likewise, as the landscaping business
gains a positive reputation, the owner can reasonably attribute
some income to goodwill and going concern value113—intangible
capital assets.
110. Cf. CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (explaining that the selfemployment tax base captures some income that represents a return on capital).
111. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL
INCOME 49 (1994) (calling it “extremely difficult—indeed, probably impossible—
to separate capital income from labor income for closely held businesses where
the owner may supply both capital and labor services”).
112. See id. at 11 (“Income is the sum of wage income and capital income.”).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1) (defining “goodwill” as “the value of a
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Thus, the owner can appropriately characterize some portion
of the business’s income as a return on her investment in those
capital assets. This return on capital is little different from a gain
realized on appreciated real estate or interest income from a
bond. Asking the landscape company owner to designate portions
of each dollar earned as income derived from the business’s
capital assets or income derived from labor, however, would be
both administratively onerous and imprecise.114
Therefore, the self-employment tax regime includes all net
income from self-employment in the tax base unless a delineated
exception excludes it.115 Despite the Internal Revenue Code’s
exclusion of several capital income categories, the inclusion
presumption inevitably subjects some income from capital to selfemployment tax.116
In a September 2012 report, the CBO attempted to divide the
self-employment tax base into its capital and labor components
and examined various proposals to better isolate labor income in
the tax base.117 Focusing on the self-employment Hospital
Insurance (SECA-HI) tax base (because it is not subject to an
income ceiling118), the CBO estimated that approximately 40% of
trade or business attributable to the expectancy of continued customer
patronage,” noting that “[t]his expectancy may be due to the name or reputation
of a trade or business or any other factor”); see also id. §1.197-2(b)(2) (describing
“going concern value” as “the additional value that attaches to property by
reason of its existence as an integral part of an ongoing business activity”).
114. Suppose the landscaper spends eight hours mowing a twenty-acre lot
using a riding lawn mower and earns $160. How much should the landscaper
attribute to the lawn mower—the capital asset—and how much should she
attribute to her skill and labor in operating it? One could argue that had the
landscaper invested in a walk-behind lawnmower rather than the riding mower,
the prospective customer may never have even considered her bid. This scenario
supports a claim that capital generated a larger portion of the income.
Regardless, this type of analysis with respect to business transactions is
generally impracticable.
115. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2012) (defining net income from self-employment
as all self-employment income except income from categories designated in
§ 1402(a)(1)–(17)); see also Dilley, supra note 8, at 97 (explaining the SECA tax
regime’s “inclusionary” approach).
116. See CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting that although
Congress intended to tax the self-employed solely on remuneration for labor, the
self-employment tax base “[does] not conform to that intent”).
117. See generally CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3.
118. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (describing the HI wage
ceiling’s history).
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the base derives from capital.119 Overall, 65% of capital income is
subject to self-employment taxes120 but more than half of labor
income—defined as the portion of a self-employed person’s income
that would be subject to FICA tax if the person were employed by
a corporation—is excluded from the SECA-HI tax base.121
The report explains that this distortion occurs because of the
self-employment tax base’s sensitivity to profitability. “[W]hen
net income from all of a taxpayer’s businesses is less than the
labor income from those businesses, the excess labor income is
excluded from the SECA tax base.”122 Profitability has no impact,
however, on a corporation’s FICA tax liability.123
Identifying ways to eliminate capital income from the selfemployment tax base proves especially difficult in the context of
pass-through entities because of the diversity of owner attitudes
about, contributions to, and goals for these businesses.124 Some
“passive” owners view the business purely as an investment,
primarily seek a financial return, and do not actively participate
in the management of the business.125 These passive owners view
returns on their “business investments” and returns on other
investments—such as stocks or bonds—as one and the same.
Arguably, we should treat the distributive shares of these passive
owners as capital income, the same as we treat dividends and
interest.
Unincorporated business forms also attract “active owners”—
individuals who actively participate in the management of the
business, provide services, and who may or may not contribute
capital.126 These owners, of course, also seek a financial return,
119. CBO SECA REPORT, supra note 3, at iv.
120. Id. at v.
121. Id. The CBO estimates that 44% of labor income is included. Id.
122. Id. at iv.
123. See id. at 2 (explaining this difference).
124. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 84 (positing that the self-employment tax
treatment of partnership income “has relied on assumptions . . . about the
relationship between the partner and the business as the indicator of whether or
not wages are being paid”).
125. See Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do
It, 62 TAX LAW. 749, 765 (2009) (explaining that “often some owners contribute
the capital necessary to start the business, while others perform the services
that will hopefully make the business successful”).
126. See id. at 765–66 (contrasting participating and nonparticipating
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but their return is linked to a greater degree to their
participation—their labor.127 When these owners receive
distributive shares of entity income (in lieu of, or in addition to,
guaranteed payments for services), the transaction looks similar
to the exchange that occurs when an employer pays wages to an
employee for work. Thus, the distributive shares of these owners
are perhaps better characterized as representing income from
labor.
If we could easily distinguish active owners from passive
owners and subject only the active owners to self-employment
taxes, our self-employment tax system would better comport with
Congress’s intent to finance Social Security through labor
income.128 The flexible nature of unincorporated businesses,
however, accommodates owners from all points on this active–
passive spectrum.129 The ability for an individual to own multiple
classes of interests in a single business further complicates the
problem.130 Thus, today’s unincorporated business landscape
permits few bright-line rules to separate labor income from
capital income for self-employment purposes.

owners).
127. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Renkemeyer Compounds the Confusion in
Characterizing Limited and General Partners—Part 2, 116 J. TAX’N 300, 317
(2012) [hereinafter Banoff, Part 2] (explaining that the distributive shares of
service-providing owners “arise from services they performed . . . rather than as
earnings that are basically of an investment nature”).
128. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 82 (arguing that “all of the statutory, as
well as regulatory, rules developed to deal with participants in pass-through tax
entities are grounded in an attempt to discern the part of a self-employed
person’s income that is actually attributable to her own labor”).
129. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Renkemeyer Compounds the Confusion in
Characterizing Limited and General Partners–Part 1, 115 J. TAX’N 306, 313
(2011) [hereinafter Banoff, Part 1] (“It is now often difficult to distinguish
between active owners of the business and passive investors.”).
130. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 113 (2001) (permitting a person to
hold both a general partner and a limited partner interest in the same
partnership).
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IV. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13): The Limited Partner Exclusion
A. The Limited Partner Exclusion Generally
The limited partner exclusion contained in Internal Revenue
Code § 1402(a)(13) represents one attempt by Congress to
establish a bright-line rule segregating labor income from capital
income for self-employment tax purposes. This controversial
provision131 permits individuals classified as “limited partners” to
exclude the distributive share of partnership income from selfemployment income.132 More specifically, § 1402(a)(13) permits
the exclusion of
the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited
partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments described in
section 707(c) to that partner for services actually rendered to
or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those
payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration
for those services[.]133

Note that salaries and professional fees received for services
actually rendered—guaranteed payments representing purely
labor income—remain subject to self-employment tax.
Congress enacted this provision as part of the Social Security
Amendments of 1977134 in response to fear that individuals were
establishing limited partnerships and investing as limited
partners solely to gain Social Security and Medicare coverage or
increase their benefit amounts—a practice considered
“inconsistent with the basic principle of the social security
program.”135 Prior to 1977, the self-employment tax on the
131. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 86 (“The SECA tax treatment of LLC
members continues to be the most controversial aspect of both the LLC and the
SECA tax areas . . . .”); see also Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 316 (noting
that there has been “little progress in identifying the operative distinctions
between ‘general partners’ and ‘limited partners’ for federal tax purposes”
despite “greater stress and importance on these distinctions” due to the
evolution of other tax and business laws).
132. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2012).
133. Id.
134. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 313(b), 91
Stat. 1536.
135. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-702 (Part I), at 40–41 (1977)
Your committee has become increasingly concerned about
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distributive shares of partnership income made no distinction
between general and limited partners, enabling individuals—
especially older persons “who may not have been covered under
the system during their working lives”—to gain insured status
not through earnings from labor but rather through passive
investment income.136
At the time of the limited partner exclusion’s adoption, the
self-employment tax rate was 7.9% and applied only to the first
$16,500 of net earnings from self-employment for both Social
Security and Medicare.137 This low rate existed because the
earnings ceiling for the Medicare portion had not yet been
abolished.138 Consequently, at the time, taxpayers widely
perceived “the value of Social Security benefits . . . to outweigh
their tax cost.”139
B. Limited Partners as a Dividing Line
Given Congress’s goal of funding Medicare and Social
Security through a tax on labor and considering the business
situations in which certain business organizations solicit
investments in limited partnerships as a means for an investor
to become insured for social security benefits. In these
situations the investor in the limited partnership performs no
services for the partnership and the social security coverage
which results is, in fact, based on income from an investment.
This situation is of course inconsistent with the basic principle
of the social security program that benefits are designed to
partially replace lost earnings from work.
136. Dilley, supra note 8, at 85; see also Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough
Entities and the Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time for a Uniform Standard?, 17
VA. TAX REV. 811, 830–31 (1998) (describing Congress’s intent “to curtail the
practice of investing in a limited partnership as a means for the investor to
become insured for social security benefits, which congressional lawmakers
found to be at odds with the fundamental purpose of the social security
system”).
137. Tax Found. Ctr. for Fed. Tax Policy, Social Security and Medicare Tax
Rates, Calendar Years 1937–2009, TAX FOUND. (May 5, 2009),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/social-security-and-medicare-tax-rates-calendaryears-1937-2009 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
138. See supra note 95 (recalling that Congress abolished the HI wage
ceiling in 1993).
139. Dilley, supra note 8, at 85.
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landscape at the time, Congress’s decision to draw this line
between limited partners and general partners made sense. In
1977, there were two primary business entity forms: corporations
and partnerships (general and limited).140 Corporations, because
they have employees, are subject to the FICA tax regime.141
Conversely, partnerships, because of their pass-through entity
tax status,142 fall within the self-employment tax regime.143
Within the partnership category, a general partnership did
not pose the same threat as a limited partnership regarding
persons investing solely to obtain Social Security and Medicare
benefits. Because general partners face unlimited personal
liability for partnership obligations,144 Congress likely thought
that a prospective investor would not expose himself to such risk
to obtain Social Security eligibility. Conversely, the limited
partnership provided an ideal opportunity to obtain benefit
eligibility through investment145 because it featured two
140. But see infra Part IV.D (discussing the emergence of new business
forms in the 1980s and 1990s).
141. See I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2012) (noting that for FICA tax purposes, the term
“wages” includes “all remuneration for employment”); see also Fritz, supra note
136, at 821 (“Employees of a C corporation (including shareholderemployees) . . . are subject to employment taxes on 100% of their wages.”).
142. See I.R.C. § 701 (“Persons carrying on business as partners shall be
liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.”).
Partnerships, unlike corporations, do not pay federal income tax as distinct
entities. ARTHUR B. WILLIS, JOHN S. PENNELL & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE,
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 2.01 (5th ed. 1994). Instead, partnership income
“passes-through” as distributive shares to the individual partners who must
report the income and pay any taxes on it through their individual income tax
returns. See id. § 2.04 (“The principal income tax characteristic of the
partnership is that it is a conduit through which the various items of
partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit are passed to the partners
unchanged and are untaxed at the partnership level.”).
143. See I.R.C. § 1401 (defining net income from self-employment to include
the “distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss . . . from
any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which [the taxpayer] is a
member”).
144. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997) (“[A]ll partners are liable
jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise
agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”).
145. Cf. Fritz, supra note 136, at 832 (“[A] partner who desires active
involvement in the partnership’s affairs and minimal exposure to the SECA tax,
may hold a small portion of his or her ownership interest as a general partner
and the majority of his or her ownership interest as a limited partner.”).
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categories of ownership interests,146 including one that offered
limited liability.147
At the time, “limited partner” connoted two characteristics:
limited liability148 and limited (or no) ability to participate in a
partnership’s management.149 In fact, a limited partner could lose
her limited liability protection by participating in control of the
partnership,150 creating a natural check on limited partners’
participation levels.
Thus, a limited partner could make a financial investment in
a limited partnership, perform little or no labor, enjoy limited
liability, and gain eligibility for Social Security benefits.151 This
eligibility pathway created opportunities for abuse and did not
align with Social Security’s goals of tying benefit eligibility to
work and funding benefits through a tax on labor.152
C. Enforcement and Interpretation Before Renkemeyer
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury
Regulations define “limited partner.”153 Until the Tax Court
146. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW
PRACTICE § 18.1 (2011) (describing the two categories of limited partnership
ownership interests).
147. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303(a) (1976) (providing that
limited partners are not personally liable for partnership obligations).
148. Id.
149. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 146, § 22.2 (explaining that
although the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) does not
prohibit limited partners from participating in management, limited
partnership agreements “almost uniformly provide” that limited partners may
not participate due to the potential loss of limited liability protection).
150. See REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (1976) (explaining circumstances
when a limited partner’s participation may make that partner liable for the
obligations of the limited partnership).
151. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 337 (describing this scenario).
152. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (noting the
fundamental purposes of Social Security).
153. See Schwidetzky, supra note 125, at 788 (“Who qualifies as a limited
partner is not defined in the Code or Regulations, but it appears from the
legislative history and the plain language of the statute that a state law limited
partner is meant.”); see also Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 317 (noting that
courts likely gave “limited partner” and “general partner” their generally
accepted, state law meanings because “neither the Code, the legislative history,
nor prior judicial construction indicated a different definition”).
AND
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decided Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver LLP v. Commissioner in
2011,154 caselaw interpreting § 1402(a)(13) focused almost
exclusively on a taxpayer’s status as a general or limited partner
under state law.155
Several taxpayers have challenged their liability for selfemployment taxes, arguing that their limited participation
should permit them to use the limited partner exclusion. Each
time, the IRS rejected the argument that participation levels—
not legal status under state law—should determine whether one
qualifies for the limited partner exclusion, and each time, the
reviewing court affirmed the taxpayers’ self-employment tax
obligations.156
In Cokes v. Commissioner,157 the taxpayer inherited working
oil and gas interests in oil fields operated by a group of oil and
gas leaseholders158 but did not personally participate in the
business’s management.159 The court rejected the taxpayer’s
argument that her lack of control meant that she was not a
partner in the venture.160 Two years later, another oil and gas
investor made a similar challenge in Johnson v. Commissioner.161
The taxpayer first argued that her passive participation did not
rise to the level of being engaged in a trade or business as
154. See infra Part VI (discussing the case).
155. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 831–32 (“[T]he Code continues to
rely . . . on local law distinctions as to an individual partner’s legal status rather
than on the substance of his or her actual relationship to the partnership.”); see
also infra notes 157–71 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the
court relied on state law classifications to interpret § 1402(a)(13)).
156. See, e.g., Cokes v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 222, 233–36 (1988) (holding the
owner of an oil field lease liable for self-employment taxes despite the owner
having never personally participated in the business because state law treated
the venture as a partnership).
157. 91 T.C. 222 (1988).
158. Id. at 225.
159. See id. at 228 (“Petitioner never attended a meeting of the . . . working
interest owners; never voted on any matter . . . ; never obtained any oil and gas
leases (except for [those inherited]); never drilled any oil wells; never supervised
any water flood or secondary recovery operations; and never promoted any ‘oil
deals’ with anyone else.”).
160. See id. at 233 (“The question before us is whether petitioner was a
member of a partnership or of a joint venture treated as a partnership, and
petitioner’s lack of control does not affect that question.”).
161. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 603 (1990).
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required by § 1401.162 Alternatively, the taxpayer argued that if
deemed a partner, the court should recognize her as a limited
partner due to her minimal participation.163 The Tax Court
rejected both of these arguments, stating, “[P]etitioner is bound
by the form in which she cast her transaction. . . . [L]imited
partnerships are creatures of agreement cast in the form
prescribed by State law. . . . [S]he and the other working interest
owners did not take the necessary steps to comply with Texas
law.”164
The state-law reliance continued in two later cases in which
taxpayers acknowledged their state law general partner status
yet argued that their minimal participation should qualify them
for the § 1402(a)(13) exclusion. The petitioners in Perry v.
Commissioner165 and Norwood v. Commissioner166 argued that
their minimal time commitments to partnership business—six to
nine hours per year in Perry167 and forty-one hours per year in
Norwood168—should override their general partner status for selfemployment tax purposes.
Again, the Tax Court rejected these arguments in favor of
state law classifications. In Perry, the court said, “Petitioner’s
personal involvement [in partnership operations] is not the
critical question where . . . the income was derived from an entity
taxable as a partnership.”169 Similar to Johnson, the Perry court
162. See id. (“Petitioner contends that the income from her working interests
is not subject to self-employment tax because the working interests are merely
investments; and that her activity in connection with the working interests does
not rise to the level of carrying on a trade or business.”).
163. See id. (“[P]etitioner argues that if she is considered to be a partner in a
partnership, she should be considered a limited partner due to the nature of her
interest.”).
164. Id.
165. T.C. Memo. 1994-215 (1994).
166. T.C. Memo. 2000-84 (2000).
167. See Perry v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-215, at 1 (1994) (explaining that
the “approximately 30 to 45 minutes each month” petitioner spends “reviewing
income and expense statements and depositing checks received” constitutes his
total participation in the partnership business).
168. See Norwood v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-84, at 1 (2000) (explaining
that petitioner’s involvement in the partnership business in the tax year at
issue totaled forty-one hours and consisted of “periodic walkthroughs” and
consultation on “major decisions of the firm”).
169. Perry, T.C. Memo 1994-215 at 2.
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lamented that “[s]tate law requires that certain formalities be
observed to create a limited partnership . . . . There is no evidence
of such formalities having been observed by the owners of
interests in the wells.”170
Rejecting Norwood’s position, the court matter-of-factly
stated, “That petitioner spent a minimal amount of time engaged
in [partnership] operations is irrelevant. . . . Petitioner’s lack of
participation in or control over [partnership] operations does not
turn his general partnership interest into a limited partnership
interest. A limited partnership must be created in the form
prescribed by State law.”171
D. Evolution of Business Organizations Since 1977
Relying on state law classifications to interpret “limited
partner” made sense during the limited partner exclusion’s early
years because state-law-based classifications could accommodate
all of the available unincorporated business ownership interest
categories. In the years following the provision’s enactment,
however, several new unincorporated business forms emerged
and gained popularity.172 These “hybrid” entities borrowed
characteristics from both the partnership form and the corporate
form, leading to unpredictability in applying many areas of law,
including tax law. The decades following § 1402(a)(13)’s
enactment also brought changes to limited partnership law that
modified the roles limited partners play in these businesses.173
After these developments, state law classifications no longer
describe all of the potential unincorporated business owners.
Thus, we can attribute many of the current problems interpreting
the limited partner exclusion to the proliferation of these new
entities and the changes in the limited partnership form.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 3.
Norwood, T.C. Memo 2000-84 at 1.
See infra Part IV.D.1–3 (describing these new forms).
See infra Part IV.D.4 (explaining these changes).
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1. The Limited Liability Company

LLCs developed in response to a need for a business form
that would afford its owners limited liability but would not be
subject to the double-taxation regime applied to corporations.174
Wyoming passed the first LLC Act in 1977,175 recognizing a
business form that afforded its owners, called “members,” limited
liability for the company’s debts and obligations and permitted all
members to participate in the company’s management.176
Although Florida passed the second LLC statute—modeled after
the Wyoming Act—in 1982,177 no other state passed an LLC
statute until 1990 due to uncertainty regarding LLC tax
treatment and concerns about members’ personal liability.178
After the IRS issued a Revenue Ruling in 1988179 stating that
LLCs properly organized under the Wyoming Act would be
treated as partnerships for tax purposes,180 other states began
authorizing LLCs.181 The IRS’s 1996 adoption of the “check-thebox” regulations182—which created the presumption that LLCs
would be treated as partnerships unless they elected to be taxed
as corporations—eliminated the uncertainty.183 By the end of
1996, all states and the District of Columbia had enacted LLC
174. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 1 RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.2 (2013).
175. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 1977 WYO. SESS. LAWS 537
(codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105 (2012)).
176. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-304 (providing for limited liability); id.
§ 17-29-407 (providing management rights for all members as a default).
177. Florida Limited Liability Company Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.401–.471
(Supp. 1982).
178. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 174, § 1.2 (describing the reasons
for the delay).
179. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
180. Id. (holding that a “Wyoming limited liability company, none of whose
members or designated managers are personally liable for any debts of the
company” is classified for federal tax purposes as a partnership).
181. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 174, § 1.2 (noting that “all of the
remaining states” adopted LLC statutes after the IRS issued these regulations).
182. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 to 301.7701-3 (1996).
183. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 313 (“The advent of the checkthe-box [r]egulations . . . effective after 1996 provided virtual certainty as to the
tax treatment of domestic LLCs as partnerships (absent their election to be
taxed as corporations).”).
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statutes.184 Today, the LLC is the fastest growing unincorporated
business form,185 and many consider it the closely held business
“entity of choice” due to its flexibility.186
2. The Limited Liability Partnership
LLPs emerged in response to the 1980s savings and loan
crisis,187 with Texas enacting the first LLP statute in 1991.188 By
the end of the decade, all states and the District of Columbia had
enacted LLP statutes.189 The LLP is a general partnership; state
law characterizes its owners as general partners.190 Registered
LLPs differ from general partnerships, however, in that LLP
partners have limited liability for partnership obligations while
general partners in general or limited partnerships do not.191 The
184. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 174, § 1.2 (listing the states and
their enacting legislation).
185. See id. § 2.1 (comparing the growth of LLCs with the growth of limited
and general partnerships in the 1990s and 2000s). From 1993 to 2010, the
number of LLCs grew from 17,000 to nearly 2.1 million. Id. Conversely, the
number of general partnerships declined from 1,176,000 to 590,512. Id. The
number of limited partnerships grew from 275,000 in 1993 to a peak of 432,550
in 2006 and has been declining since, with 374,889 registered in 2010. Id.
186. See, e.g., Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in
the United States Between 2004–2007 and How Those LLCs Were Taxed for Tax
Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459–60 (2010) (calling the
LLC “undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in the United
States” and noting that “the number of new LLCs formed in America in 2007
[outpaced] the number of new corporations formed by a margin of nearly two to
one”).
187. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships:
Present at Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1995) (“The LLP is a
direct outgrowth of the collapse of real estate and energy prices in the late
1980s, and the concomitant disaster that befell Texas’s banks and savings and
loan associations.”).
188. 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3234 (codified at TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 801–803, 805) (1991).
189. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 146, § 32:1 n.3 (listing the LLP
statutes for all jurisdictions).
190. See id. (“The limited liability partnership (LLP) is a form of general
partnership, created under state general partnership laws.”).
191. Compare REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997) (providing the
default rule that “all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations
of the partnership”), with id. § 306(c) (“An obligation of a partnership incurred
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LLP form, popular in accounting and law firms, functions as
“‘peace of mind’ insurance for innocent partners,”192 protecting
their personal assets from risk of negligence or malpractice by
another partner “over whom [they] ha[ve] no control and quite
possibly ha[ve] never met.”193
3. The Limited Liability Limited Partnership
The limited liability limited partnership (LLLP) emerged in
the late 1990s and gained sufficient popularity for inclusion in
the 2001 Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA).194 Unlike the
LLP, the limited partnership provides the structural basis for the
LLLP form.195 Similar to the LLP, however, all partners in an
LLLP—both general and limited—have limited liability
protection.196 A limited partnership becomes an LLLP by
registering with the state.197
4. Changes to Limited Partnerships: The “Control Rule” Fades
Away
The years following the limited partner exclusion’s
enactment also brought changes to the limited partnership form.
The relaxation and eventual abolishment of the “Control Rule,”
while the partnership is a limited liability partnership, . . . is solely the
obligation of the partnership. A partner is not personally liable . . . for such a
partnership obligation solely by reason of being or so acting as a partner.”).
192. Hamilton, supra note 187, at 1066.
193. Id.
194. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 583, 619–20 (2004) (explaining that the
drafters of the 2001 ULPA included the LLLP form after recognizing that a
“growing number” of states had amended their limited partnership statutes to
permit LLLPs).
195. CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 146, § 32:5.
196. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (2001) (“An obligation of a limited
partnership incurred while the limited partnership is a limited liability limited
partnership . . . is solely the obligation of the limited partnership. A general
partner is not personally liable . . . for such an obligation solely by reason of
being or acting as a general partner.”).
197. See id. § 201(a) (noting that a limited partnership must state in its
certificate whether it is an LLLP).
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which had long influenced limited partners’ ability to participate
in partnership business, had a particularly important impact on
the limited partner exclusion problem.
Under the Control Rule’s initial formulation, expressed in the
1916 ULPA,198 a limited partner could lose her limited liability
protection by “tak[ing] part in the control of the business.”199 This
potential penalty deterred limited partners from taking active
roles in partnership management.200 The 1976 Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (RULPA),201 eventually enacted in all
but six states,202 relaxed the Control Rule by creating a
“bifurcated standard of liability” for limited partners.203 If a
limited partner “[took] part in the control of the business” but did
not participate to a degree “substantially the same as the exercise
of the powers of a general partner,” then the limited partner
could only be liable to creditors with “actual knowledge” of the
limited partner’s participation in control.204 A limited partner
who participated to “substantially the same” degree as a general
partner remained potentially liable to all third parties
transacting business with the partnership.205
198. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1916).
199. See id. § 7 (“A limited partner shall not become liable as a general
partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited
partner, he takes part in the control of the business.”). For an illustration of the
1916 ULPA Control Rule—the prevailing rule when Congress enacted
§ 1402(a)(13)—consider Holzman v. de Escamilla, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1948). Holzman held two limited partners in a vegetable business liable as
general partners because they exercised control of the business (evidenced by
their involvement in choosing the business’s crops and their ability to control
partnership funds without the general partner’s consent). Id. at 859–60.
200. See Joseph J. Basile, Jr., Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An
Argument for Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1985)
(“[A]n obvious tension arises between the limited partners’ desire to exercise
control over important decisions affecting the partnership and the threat of
personal liability for taking part, or participating, in the control of the business
of the partnership.”).
201. REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1976).
202. See Unif. Law Comm’n, Enactment Status Map, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT (1976), available
at
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Limited
Partnership Act (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (highlighting states that enacted
the 1976 RULPA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. Basile, supra note 200, at 1210.
204. REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (1976).
205. See Basile, supra note 200, at 1211 (explaining this scenario). Basile
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The 1985 RULPA revisions further limited the Control Rule’s
scope. These amendments provided that a limited partner who
participated in the control of the business would be liable only “to
persons who transact business with the limited partnership
reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner’s conduct,
that the limited partner is a general partner.”206 Finally, the 2001
ULPA, adopted by eighteen states,207 eliminated the Control Rule
entirely, stating:
An obligation of a limited partnership, whether arising in
contract, tort, or otherwise, is not the obligation of a limited
partner. A limited partner is not personally liable, directly or
indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for an
obligation of the limited partnership solely by reason of being
a limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the
management and control of the limited partnership.208

Without the Control Rule to deter participation, limited partners
in states adopting the 2001 ULPA today face no disincentive to
participate actively in a limited partnership’s management.
E. Problems Presented by New Unincorporated Entity Forms
These new forms (and the limited partnership’s evolution)
create problems in applying the limited partner exclusion because
they violate the “fundamental assumptions” about limited
partnerships that first prompted Congress to enact the
exclusion.209 The dividing line Congress believed existed between
limited partners and general partners in 1977 (limited partners
also notes that this structure prevents a limited partner from “exercis[ing] all of
the powers of a general partner while avoiding any direct dealings with third
parties” to retain her limited liability. Id. (quoting RULPA § 303 cmt.).
206. REV. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (1985).
207. See Unif. Law Comm’n, Enactment Status Map, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT (2001), http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Limited Partnership Act (last
visited Sept. 15, 2013) (highlighting states that have enacted the 2001 ULPA)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
208. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001) (emphasis added).
209. See John R. Marquis, Current Status of Limited Liability Companies
and the Self-Employment Income Tax, MICH. B.J., May 1998, at 440, 441
(explaining that changes, such as the RULPA’s expanded partner participation
rules, “call into question the fundamental assumptions” on which Congress
founded the exception).
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with limited liability and limited participation on one side;
general partners with unlimited liability and full participation on
the other) no longer exists.210 “Limited partner” no longer
unequivocally means “passive investor.”
Arguably, none of today’s unincorporated business forms fit
the archetypal limited partner structure that Congress relied on
in 1977. LLPs and LLLPs afford both general and limited
partners limited liability.211 As a definitional matter, LLCs have
neither limited partners nor general partners. All LLC members
may participate in management, and all may benefit from limited
liability, regardless of their level of participation.212 Further, the
LLC form can accommodate both owners who use it as a passive
investment vehicle and owners who seek to conduct an active
business.213 Even the trusty limited partnership no longer fits the
mold.214
Uncertainty for taxpayers and tax professionals and
unpredictability within the self-employment tax regime has
developed. Without definitive guidance from the IRS or Congress
on how to apply the “old” rule to “new” businesses, taxpayers
have freedom to interpret the rule for themselves. This freedom
creates opportunities for taxpayers to organize their businesses in
such a way as to avoid self-employment taxes entirely or to take
aggressive tax positions that they would be less likely to take if
clear guidance existed.215 For example, an LLC member could
argue that her limited liability entitles her to exclude her income
under § 1402(a)(13) even though statutorily speaking, she does
not hold a limited partner interest and her business is not a
210. See supra Part IV.D.1–4 (discussing unincorporated business entity
changes).
211. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing LLPs); see also
supra note 196 and accompanying text (providing the rule for LLLPs).
212. See supra Part IV.D.1 (detailing the LLC form).
213. See Schwidetsky, supra note 125, at 790 (comparing members’
authority in member-managed LLCs and manager-managed LLCs).
214. See Marquis, supra note 209, at 441 (questioning whether the limited
partner exclusion’s assumption that limited partners in traditional limited
partnerships do not participate in management has “any lingering validity”).
215. See Dilley, supra note 8, at 81–82 (noting the “considerable time and
effort” taxpayers and tax planners have spent “developing strategies for
recasting income that might be considered self-employment earnings as passive
types of income that are excluded from the [SECA tax] base”).
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limited partnership.216 Accepting this argument—limited liability
as a sufficient condition for the limited partner exclusion—would
create a gaping hole in the self-employment tax base.217
Conversely, a passive LLC member who prefers a more
conservative stance given the dearth of guidance on the issue
may choose not to claim the limited partner exclusion. This choice
would likely inject capital income into the self-employment tax
base, another disfavored result.
Finally, the lack of guidance leads to disparate treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers across various business forms.218 The
uncertainty may even prompt a taxpayer who prefers one form to
select another because it provides a more certain path to obtain
the exclusion for legitimately passive owners.219
V. Attempts to Interpret and Apply § 1402(a)(13) in the Modern
Business Context
Recognizing these issues, the Treasury Department has twice
attempted to provide guidance to taxpayers on how to interpret
the limited partner exclusion. Regulations proposed in 1994 dealt
specifically with interpretation issues faced by LLC members;220
the 1997 proposed regulations aimed to provide guidance to all
unincorporated business entities.221 Analyzing these proposed
regulations reveals a shift in the IRS’s position from reliance on
state law classifications to analysis of an owner’s participation in
the business. This shift reflects the IRS’s desire to realign the
216. See infra Part VI.A (discussing Renkemeyer, in which the LLP partner
made essentially the same argument).
217. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 319–20 (finding it “troublesome”
and “inappropriate” to use limited versus unlimited liability for this purpose).
218. See Marquis, supra note 209, at 441 (“Why should a limited partner
who does not participate in his . . . partnership’s business affairs escape [selfemployment taxes] while an LLC member who chooses not to participate in . . .
her LLC’s affairs cannot? . . . Are they not ‘functionally’ the same vis-à-vis the
entity (neither participates and both have limited liability)?”).
219. See id. (“Why should business persons be forced to cho[o]se a limited
partnership form over an LLC form just to avoid the possibility that one of the
participants would have [net earnings from self-employment] from the LLC
when he or she would not from the limited partnership?”).
220. See infra Part V.A (discussing the 1994 proposed regulations).
221. See infra Part V.B (discussing the 1997 proposed regulations).
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limited partner exclusion with its original purpose: to remove
income from passive capital investments from the SECA tax base.
A. 1994 Proposed Treasury Regulations
The first attempt to clear some of the confusion regarding the
meaning of “limited partner” came in 1994 when the IRS issued
proposed regulations222 that applied § 1402(a)(13) to LLCs
classified as partnerships for federal tax purposes.223 These
regulations offered a two-part analysis—comprising the
“Management Test” and “Limited Partner Equivalency Test”—for
determining whether an LLC member would be considered a
“limited partner” for § 1402(a)(13) purposes.224 To pass the
Management Test, an LLC member could not be a “manager”225—
meaning she had to lack authority to make management
decisions for the LLC.226 A taxpayer could easily apply this test
because LLC operating agreements typically specify whether the
LLC is member-managed or manager-managed and delineate any
management rights of members outside of default rules.227
After satisfying the Management Test, the taxpayer would
then analyze her company under the two-part Limited Partner
Equivalency Test. This test first asks whether the LLC could
have been formed as a limited partnership rather than an LLC in

222. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18, 59 Fed. Reg. 67253 (Dec. 29, 1994).
223. See generally id. See also Timothy R. Koski, Self-Employment Tax and
Limited Liability Companies: When Are LLC Earnings Subject to SelfEmployment Tax?, TAXES, Sept. 2005, at 33, 34 (describing the proposed
regulations and their purposes). Recall that the “check-the-box” regulations
providing that LLCs would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes as a
default were not issued until 1996. See supra note 182 and accompanying text
(explaining the “check-the-box” regulations).
224. Koski, supra note 223, at 34.
225. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(b)(1), 59 Fed. Reg. at 67254.
226. See id. § 1.1402(c)(2) (defining “manager” as a person who “alone or
together with others, is vested with the continuing exclusive authority to make
the management decisions necessary to conduct the business for which the LLC
was formed”).
227. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407(a) (2006) (establishing
member-management as a default rule unless the operating agreement elects
manager-management).
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the same jurisdiction where it was formed.228 Next, the test asks
whether the member “could have qualified as a limited partner in
that limited partnership under applicable law.”229 If the taxpayer
could answer both questions affirmatively, she would be treated
as a limited partner for § 1402(a)(13) purposes.230
The proposed regulations received a “mixed response.”231
Critics expressed concern that the Limited Partner Equivalency
Test’s reliance on state law classifications would create
possibilities for disparate treatment.232 Because state limited
partner statutes differ in the extent to which they allow limited
partners to participate in management, a participating,
nonmanager LLC member could satisfy the test (and benefit from
the § 1402(a)(13) exclusion) if his LLC was formed in one state,
but fail it (denying him the exclusion) if his LLC had been formed
in another.233
Commentators also criticized the proposed regulations as
being too complex, claiming that applying the regulations
“depend[s] upon legal or factual determinations that may be
difficult for taxpayers or the IRS to make with certainty.”234
Others supported a “material participation” test for LLC
members, claiming that it would eliminate uncertainty and better
serve the policy goal of including labor income in the selfemployment tax base.235 Other critics argued that the regulations
fell short because they failed to establish a uniform test

228. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(b)(2), 59 Fed. Reg. 67253, 67254 (Dec. 29,
1994).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Koski, supra note 223, at 34.
232. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)–2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13,
1997) (describing comments received in response to the 1994 regulations that
highlighted the possibility for disparate treatment between members of different
LLCs with “identical rights” based solely on state limited partnership statute
differences).
233. See Koski, supra note 223, at 34 (explaining the possibility for disparate
treatment).
234. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)–2, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1702.
235. See id. (noting that a material participation test would “better
implement the self-employment tax goal of taxing compensation for services”).
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applicable to all unincorporated entities whose owners may be
subject to self-employment tax.236
Finally, some commentators stated that the proposed
regulations did not adequately address the self-employment tax
treatment of taxpayers holding more than one class of ownership
interest.237 These critics claimed the proposed regulations created
an “all-or-nothing” test that would prevent members who held
both “limited-partner-like” and “general-partner-like” LLC
interests from using § 1402(a)(13) to exclude income from their
limited-partner-like interests.238 Citing § 1402(a)(13)’s legislative
history, these critics argued that this system violated Congress’s
intention to tax only general partners’ distributive shares and
demanded that the Treasury Department revise the regulations
to respect the bifurcation of ownership interests.239
B. 1997 Proposed Treasury Regulations
Recognizing the 1994 proposed regulations’ weaknesses, the
Treasury Department withdrew its 1994 notice of proposed
rulemaking and simultaneously proposed new regulations in
January 1997.240 The 1997 proposed regulations would apply to
“all entities classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes,
regardless of state law characterization of the entity.”241
According to the IRS, this uniform standard would analyze “the
relationship between the partner, the partnership, and the
236. See id. (preferring a “more uniform approach” to govern all
unincorporated business entities).
237. See id. (discussing issues surrounding ownership interest bifurcation).
238. See id. (“The proposed regulations treated an LLC member as a limited
partner with respect to his . . . entire interest (if the member was not a manager
and satisfied the limited partner equivalence test), or not at all (if either the
management test or limited partner equivalence test was not satisfied).”); see
also Koski, supra note 223, at 34 (explaining that the proposed regulations
classified a partner as “either a general partner or a limited partner with
respect to his entire interest in the partnership”).
239. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13,
1997) (outlining these critics’ legislative history-based argument that Congress
intended to subject only general partnership interests to self-employment
taxes).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1703.
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partnership’s business”242 rather than treat state law
characterizations of partners as determinative.243 The analysis
would rely on functional tests related to the individual’s
participation in the business.244 Affirming the 1994 regulation
feedback, the IRS noted that the new approach would ensure that
similarly situated taxpayers did not receive differing selfemployment tax treatment based solely on their entity’s state of
formation.245 The IRS acknowledged the need for a functional test
in light of the “proliferation” of new business entities and the
“evolution of state limited partnership statutes”—specifically, the
extent to which some limited partners may now participate while
retaining limited liability.246
Unlike the 1994 regulations, the 1997 regulations presumed
limited partnership status for § 1402(a)(13) purposes unless the
taxpayer met one of three tests.247 The first test (the “Liability
Test”) denied limited partner status to individuals who had
“personal liability . . . for the debts of or claims against the
partnership by reason of being a partner.”248 Second, an
individual with “authority to contract on behalf of the
partnership under the statute or law pursuant to which the
partnership is organized” would not retain limited partner status
(the “Authority Test”).249 The final test (the “Material
Participation Test”) focused on the extent of an owner’s
participation in the business.250 Any individual who
242. Id.
243. See id. (“State law characterizations of an individual as a ‘limited
partner’ or otherwise are not determinative.”). This language suggests that the
participation standard would apply even to an individual properly characterized
as a “limited partner” under state law.
244. See id. at 1702 (detailing the functional tests).
245. See id. (“By adopting these functional tests, the proposed regulations
ensure that similarly situated individuals owning interests in entities formed
under different statutes or in different jurisdictions will be treated similarly.”).
246. Id.
247. Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704
(Jan. 13, 1997) (“An individual is treated as a limited partner . . . unless . . . .”
(emphasis added)), with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18, 59 Fed. Reg. 67253,
67253 (Dec. 29, 1994) (“[A] member of an LLC will be treated as a limited
partner only if . . . .” (emphasis added)).
248. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. at 1704.
249. Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(ii).
250. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(iii) (describing the test).
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“participate[d] in the partnership’s trade or business for more
than 500 hours during the partnership’s taxable year” would not
be considered a limited partner.251
In addition, the regulations excepted “service partnerships”—
defined as partnerships in which “substantially all” activities
relate to the performance of services in the fields of health, law,
engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, or
consulting—from the general test.252 “Service partners”—
individuals providing services “to or on behalf of the service
partnership’s trade or business”253—could not utilize the limited
partner exception, even if they satisfied the three functional
tests.254
The 1997 proposal also addressed bifurcated ownership
interests. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)
permits an individual who fails the functional tests (by holding a
general-partner-like interest) to nonetheless exclude income
related to his limited-partner-like ownership interest upon
meeting two conditions.255 First, there must be other owners of
the purported limited-partnership-like class of interest who
satisfy the functional tests set forth in Proposed Regulation
§ 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2).256 Second, the individual owning the
bifurcated interest must have rights and obligations with respect
to the limited-partner-like ownership interest that are identical
to the rights and obligations of the other limited partners.257
The regulations also provide a path to limited partner status
for individuals who hold only one class of ownership interest and
fail only the Material Participation Test.258 Similar to the
bifurcated-interest holder, the “material participant” can still
251. Id.
252. Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(iii).
253. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan.
13, 1997). The regulations provide that a partner is not considered a “service
partner” if he “only provides a de minimis amount of services to or on behalf of
the partnership.” Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(ii).
254. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(5) (clarifying that a service partner in a service
partnership may not gain limited partner status under any of the three tests in
§1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)–(4)).
255. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3) (noting this possibility).
256. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(i) (explaining this condition).
257. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(ii) (explaining this condition).
258. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4) (describing the exclusion).
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receive limited partner treatment if the entity has other owners
who satisfy the functional tests and the material participant’s
rights and obligations are identical to the rights of the limited
partners.259 In this scenario, the taxpayer would pay selfemployment tax on guaranteed payments for her services but
could exclude her distributive share under § 1402(a)(13).260
Together, these two rules work toward the goal of excluding
“amounts that are demonstrably returns on capital invested in
the partnership” rather than labor.261
The 1997 proposed regulations were “severely criticized by
Congress.”262 Influenced by prominent business leaders such as
Steve Forbes, who called the proposed regulations “a major tax
increase by a stealth regulatory decree,”263 Congress feared that
the proposed regulations—specifically the Material Participation
Test—would adversely affect small businesses.264 Discussion of
the proposed regulations through popular media channels like
The Rush Limbaugh Show allowed the proposed regulations to
gain “wide notoriety among the rank and file voters, most of
whom it is safe to say had little understanding of their real effect,
intended or otherwise.”265
Practitioners noted that the regulations generated criticism
because they “appeared to change the statutory rules so as to
make more limited partners subject to the self-employment tax.266
In reality, these practitioners said, the regulations were more

259. See id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4)(i)–(ii) (explaining this exception).
260. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1703 (Jan. 13,
1997) (describing how the proposed regulation would apply to this scenario).
261. Id.
262. Koski, supra note 223, at 36.
263. William H. Byrnes & Robert Bloink, Tax Court Revives Partnership Self
Employment
Tax
Debate,
ADVISORONE
(Mar.
25,
2011),
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2011/03/25/tax-court-revives-partnership-self-em
ployment-tax?t=legal-compliance&page=2 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
264. See id. (stating that twenty-three senators expressed specific concerns
about the Material Participation Test’s impact on small business owners’ tax
bills).
265. Marquis, supra note 209, at 442.
266. Id.
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likely to significantly decrease the number of LLC members
subject to the tax.267
C. Regulatory Moratorium and Aftermath
Nonetheless, the criticism led Congress to enact a one-year
moratorium on the rulemaking process for the proposed
regulations.268 Despite the moratorium’s limited duration, the
IRS, having many other regulatory and enforcement priorities,
likely interpreted the moratorium as an order not to raise the
issue again—not in one year, and perhaps not ever. A nonbinding
resolution269 passed in conjunction with the moratorium supports
this interpretation. The resolution expressed the Senate’s concern
that the proposed regulations “exceed[] the regulatory authority
of the Treasury Department and would effectively change the law
administratively without congressional action.”270 Further, the
resolution stated, “It is the sense of the Senate that . . . Congress,
not the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue
Service, should determine the tax law governing self-employment
income for limited partners.”271
In the fifteen years since the moratorium expired, neither
Congress nor the IRS has restarted the rulemaking process.272
Taxpayers and tax professionals remain uncertain regarding the
proposed regulations’ importance because the IRS never officially
withdrew them.273 While some scholars and practitioners have
267. See id. (predicting that the regulations would have subjected fewer LLC
members to self-employment tax).
268. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat.
788, 882 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (providing that “no
temporary or final regulation with respect to the definition of a limited partner
under section 1402(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 may be issued or
made effective before July 1, 1998”).
269. 143 CONG. REC. S6693–96 (daily ed. June 27, 1997).
270. Id. at S6694.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. See Koski, supra note 223, at 36 (noting that the regulations have not
been finalized and neither Congress nor the IRS has issued any other definitive
guidance).
273. See, e.g., ROBERT R. KEATINGE, NEW CURRENTS IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT
TAXES AND THE DEFINITION OF “LIMITED PARTNER”: PLANNING IN LIGHT OF
RENKEMEYER, THE MEDICARE TAX CHANGES WHICH TAKE EFFECT IN 2013, AND
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called the proposed regulations “the most definitive guidance
available” on how to apply § 1402(a)(13) to LLCs,274 others believe
the regulations have limited value. For these critics, such as
Robert Keatinge, the only truly “definitive guidance” on how to
apply § 1402(a)(13) to LLCs comes from private letter rulings
issued in the mid-1990s, which held that the provision did not
exclude LLC members’ distributive shares from self-employment
taxes.275 Keatinge believes these rulings suggest that all LLC
members, “regardless of the level of their activities or their
authority or participation in management” are subject to selfemployment tax.”276 Despite his reluctance to rely on the
proposed regulations in advising clients, Keatinge acknowledges
that according to Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii),277 the
IRS considers proposed regulations “substantial authority” for
purposes of avoiding accuracy-related penalties related to tax
underpayment.278
After the moratorium’s political uproar faded, the limited
partner exclusion problem received little publicity until 2011,
when an aggressive tax position taken by three lawyers from
Kansas gave the Tax Court the perfect opportunity to suggest a
new interpretation of § 1402(a)(13).

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 12–13 (2012) (discussing the effect of regulations that
have been issued but have not yet become effective) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
274. Koski, supra note 223, at 34.
275. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9525058 (June 23, 1995) (ruling that
distributive shares of members of a prospective law firm LLC would be subject
to self-employment tax); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9452024 (Dec. 30, 1994)
(explaining that although an LLC is classified as a partnership for federal tax
purposes, an LLC is not a limited partnership and its members are not limited
partners, meaning that self-employment taxes apply to LLC distributive
shares); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9432018 (Aug. 12, 1994) (determining that LLC
members’ distributive shares did not qualify for exclusion from self-employment
tax based on § 1402(a)(13)); see also KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 13 (explaining
his interpretation of the private letter rulings).
276. KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 13.
277. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2003).
278. See id. (listing “proposed, temporary and final regulations” construing
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as sources of substantial authority
related to accuracy-related penalties for understating tax liabilities); see also
KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 13 (acknowledging the regulations’ value for this
purpose).
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VI. Renkemeyer Renews Attention on the Issue
The February 2011 ruling in Renkemeyer, Campbell &
Weaver LLP v. Commissioner renewed attention on the limited
partner exclusion not only because the case demonstrates the
potential for abuse created by the provision’s uncertainty, but
also because the Tax Court departed from precedent in
abandoning strict reliance on state law classifications to instead
rely on the legislative intent behind § 1402(a)(13) and apply a
participation-focused standard.
A. Analyzing Renkemeyer
The petitioner-taxpayer, Troy Renkemeyer, performed legal
services as a partner in a law firm organized as an LLP under
Kansas law.279 For tax year 2004, the LLP had four partners:
Renkemeyer, two other attorneys (Todd Campbell and Tracy
Weaver), and RCGW Investment Management, an S corporation
owned by RCGW Investment Management Inc., Employee Stock
Ownership Plan and Trust (ESOP).280 The ESOP listed
Renkemeyer, Weaver, and Campbell as its beneficiaries.281 Each
attorney partner held a one-third capital interest and a 30%
profits and loss interest in the firm.282 The S corporation held the
remaining 10% profits and loss interest.283 In 2004, despite
deriving 99% of its net business income from fees for legal
services rendered by Renkemeyer, Campbell, and Weaver, the
law firm allocated 87.557% of its net business income to the S
corporation.284 In tax year 2005, the law firm reorganized,
eliminating the S corporation partner and assigning each of the
remaining three partners—Renkemeyer, Campbell, and

279.
(2011).
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C., 137, 138
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139–40.
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Weaver—a 1% “General Managing Partner Interest” and a 32%
“Investing Partner Interest.”285
None of the attorney partners included their partnership
distributive shares on their tax returns as net income from selfemployment.286 Instead, Renkemeyer argued that the IRS should
characterize his interest (along with Campbell’s and Weaver’s) as
a limited partner interest, which would exclude the income from
net earnings from self-employment under I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13).287
Renkemeyer said that his interest deserved this classification
because the law firm’s organizational documents “designated [the
attorney-partners’ interests] as limited partnership interests”
and because the partners “enjoy[ed] limited liability pursuant to
Kansas law.”288
The Tax Court rejected Renkemeyer’s argument.289 The court
began its analysis by contrasting the state-law-based
characteristics of LLPs and limited partnerships. It emphasized
that unlike an LLP, a limited partnership features two distinct
classes of partnership interests: general partners and limited
partners.290 The court also noted that in traditional limited
partnerships, limited partners lack management power and have
limited liability for partnership debts so long as they do not
actively participate in the control of the partnership (mentioning
RULPA 1976).291 Accordingly, these characteristics beget the
inference that “the interest of a limited partner in a limited
partnership is generally akin to that of a passive investor.”292 In
contrast, general partnerships registered under state law as
LLPs—such as Renkemeyer’s firm—allow partners to enjoy both
limited liability and management powers.293
285. Id. at 141–42.
286. Id. at 139.
287. Id. at 147.
288. Id. Note that Mr. Renkemeyer did not argue that his LLP was a limited
partnership under Kansas law.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 147–48.
293. See id. at 148 (“In essence, an L.L.P. is a general partnership that
affords a form of limited liability protection for all its partners by filing a
statement of qualification with the appropriate state authorities.”).
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The court then reviewed potential authority to aid in
interpreting § 1402(a)(13). After noting that Congress enacted the
limited partner exclusion “at a time (1977) before entities such as
L.L.P.s were contemplated,”294 the court considered the 1994 and
1997 Proposed Treasury Regulations, which aimed to provide
guidance on applying § 1402(a)(13) to modern business forms.295
Because Congress and the Treasury Department had never
enacted the regulations nor issued any other “pronouncements
with respect to the definition of a limited partner for purposes of
the self-employment tax,”296 the court said it was “left to interpret
the statute without elaboration.”297
Accepting that “limited partner” has no accepted “ordinary
meaning,” the court focused on the limited partner exclusion’s
legislative history to discern a definition.298 Specifically, the court
focused on the limited partner exclusion’s original purpose: to
prevent individuals from using earnings that are “basically of an
investment nature” to receive Social Security benefits.299 From
this analysis, the court concluded that “[t]he legislative history of
section 1402(a)(13) does not support a holding that Congress
contemplated excluding partners who performed services for a
partnership in their capacity as partners . . . from liability for
self-employment taxes.”300 The Tax Court then held that the
petitioners owed self-employment taxes on their distributive
shares because the earnings arose from the legal services the
taxpayers had performed.301
294. Id.
295. See id. at 148–49 (describing the 1997 proposed regulations and the
negative response that led to Congress issuing the 1998 moratorium).
296. Id. at 149.
297. Id.
298. See id. (“It is a well-established rule of construction that if a statute
does not define a term, the term is to be given its ordinary meaning. . . . And we
look to the legislative history to ascertain Congress’ intent if the statutory
purpose is obscured by ambiguity.”).
299. See id. at 149–50 (“‘The bill would exclude from social security
coverage, the distributive share of income or loss received by a limited partner
from the trade or business of a limited partnership. This is to exclude for
coverage purposes certain earnings which are basically of an investment
nature.’” (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 95-702, at 11 (1977))).
300. Id. at 150.
301. See id. (finding it “clear that the partners’ distributive shares of the law
firm’s income did not arise as a return on the partners’ investment” but instead
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B. Responses to Renkemeyer

A general consensus exists that the Tax Court correctly ruled
against the petitioner in Renkemeyer302 in light of the taxpayer’s
“aggressive”—to some, “ridiculous”303—position.304 Although the
result—requiring Renkemeyer to pay self-employment taxes on
the disputed income—did not surprise many in the tax
community, the court’s analysis in reaching that result and its
perceived implications have elicited a spirited response.
First, critics note that the Renkemeyer facts provided an easy
path for the court to rule for the government—one that did not
require inquiry into legislative history. Because Kansas law
recognized Renkemeyer and associates as “general partners,” the
court needed only to cite the three previous cases (Johnson,
Perry, and Norwood),305 which found state law partner status
determinative.306 The opinion did not mention those cases, nor
did it directly declare that Renkemeyer, Campbell, and Weaver
were “not limited partners” (even though it mentioned that

“arose from legal services [the partners]performed on behalf of the law firm” and
were thus subject to self-employment taxes).
302. See Banoff, Part 2, supra note 127, at 300 (calling the decision
“correct”); Thomas R. Wechter, Are Service Performing Partners of LPs, LLPs or
LLCs Exempt From Self-Employment Taxes?, AICPA TAX INSIDER, Aug. 2011,
available
at
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/are_service_performing_
partners_exempt_from_self_employment_taxes_4183.html (calling the decision
“not a surprise”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
303. See Shamik Trivedi, Renkemeyer Facts Limit Decision’s Scope,
Practitioners Say, 133 TAX NOTES 555, 555 (Oct. 31, 2011) (quoting one
practitioner who said, “Seeing law firm partners trying to assert that they’re not
subject to self-employment taxes seems ridiculous”).
304. See Susan L. Megaard & Michael M. Megaard, Reducing SelfEmployment Taxes on Owners of LLPs and LLCs After Renkemeyer, PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES, Aug. 2011, at 52, 52 (calling the result “not surprising”).
305. See supra Part IV.C (discussing these cases).
306. See Amy S. Elliott, Tax Court Decision Could Reignite Debate over
Partnerships and Employment Taxes, 130 TAX NOTES 1244, 1245 (Mar. 14, 2011)
(“By issuing [the opinion] the court opted not to do what other courts ruling in
this area have done, which was simply to hold that [petitioners] were not limited
partners of a state law [limited partnership] and therefore could not take
advantage of the [limited partner exclusion].”); see also Banoff, Part 2, supra
note 127, at 304–05 (criticizing the court’s assertion that “limited partner” is a
term “obscured by ambiguity” given that courts have found the term’s ordinary
meaning “clear, under state law”).
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Kansas law recognizes their LLP as a general partnership).307
Also, Sheldon I. Banoff noted that neither party’s brief discussed
§ 1402(a)(13)’s legislative history “[n]or gave any mention of it as
being relevant” to resolving the issue.308
Critics have also expressed frustration that Renkemeyer
creates more uncertainty in an area of law already quite
uncertain.309 Some practitioners fear that the Tax Court’s
emphasis on participation to determine limited partner status
implies that even those individuals classified as limited partners
by state law—the exact group the limited partner exclusion
originally targeted—may forfeit the exclusion through
substantial participation.310
Finally, observers claim Renkemeyer has created further
confusion regarding the applicability of the 1997 proposed
regulations to LLP partners and LLC members.311 Some say the
court’s “functional” approach—looking at whether a partner
actively participated in the partnership and whether income from
the partnership is predominantly “of an investment nature”—
closely resembles the 1997 proposed regulations’ functional
approach.312 Though the Renkemeyer Court mentioned the
proposed regulations, it did not directly affirm or dismiss them,

307. See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137,
147–48 (2011) (explaining that LLPs retain their general partnership status
under Kansas law); see also Wechter, supra note 302 (criticizing the decision for
taking a functional approach “[r]ather than merely holding that a partner in a
state law LLP is not a [limited partner] for purposes of self-employment tax”).
308. Banoff, Part 2, supra note 127, at 305.
309. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 306, at 1246 (“[P]ractitioners said that the
level of uncertainty in this area is so great that not only would it be common to
find inconsistent positions taken within an accounting firm, but also it wouldn’t
be surprising to find inconsistent positions taken by the same accountant.”).
310. See KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 15 (“If, as the opinion suggests,
‘limited partner’ must be understood by reference to whether the partner
performs services, the opinion might be broadly read to hold that a limited
partner under state law who performs services is not a ‘limited partner’ for
purposes of IRC § 1402(a)(13).”).
311. See id. at 15 (“The opinion calls into question whether the 1997
Regulations have application to partners in LLPs and members in LLCs.”); see
also Banoff, Part 2, supra note 127, at 308–15 (describing these concerns).
312. See Wechter, supra note 302 (comparing the court’s approach to the
1997 proposed regulations).
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stating only that without final regulations, the court felt obliged
“to interpret the statute without elaboration.”313
Following the Renkemeyer decision, IRS special counsel
Dianna Miosi, while speaking at the May 2011 American Bar
Association Section of Taxation meeting, stated that taxpayers
“can rely” on the 1997 proposed regulations.314 Still, conservative
practitioners argue that “can” rely does not mean “should” rely
and question advising clients based on Miosi’s comments.315
VII. The Next-Best Solution: Adopt a Material Participation
Standard
The reactions to Renkemeyer illustrate the tax community’s
desire for definitive interpretive guidance. The case exemplifies
the inconsistency—and in some instances, abuse—that
§ 1402(a)(13)’s current murky status has produced. The ideal
solution to this problem would be a standard that required each
business owner to characterize each dollar of her distributive
share of entity income as either a return on labor or a return on
capital. Only the portion categorized as a return on labor would
be subject to self-employment taxes. This solution, as previously
discussed, is not practicable because it is so difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to make such characterizations with precision.316
Further, such a system would rely heavily on a taxpayer’s
subjective judgment. This subjectivity invites inconsistent
application and increases opportunities for abuse or aggressive
positions like the one taken in Renkemeyer.317
The next-best approach is to adopt a material participation
standard to determine whether an unincorporated business
313. Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137, 148–
49 (2011).
314. See Monte A. Jackel, Has Politics Trumped Policy?, 131 TAX NOTES 745,
746 (May 16, 2011) (describing Miosi’s statements).
315. See id. at 746–47 (“[B]eing oral advice and not in compliance with the
governing revenue procedure on written advice to taxpayers, [Miosi’s statement]
is not binding on the government.”).
316. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing these practical
difficulties).
317. See supra note 9 (describing how reliance on self-classification of
income can lead to abuse or inconsistent designations).
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owner’s distributive share of entity income belongs in the selfemployment tax base. A material participation standard, such as
the one outlined in the 1997 proposed Treasury regulations,318
provides only the “next-best” solution because it suffers from the
same flaw that plagues the limited partner exclusion as it exists
today: it is all or nothing.319 A distributive share is treated as
though it is entirely a return on labor and taxed, or treated as
though it is entirely a return on capital and excluded. In reality,
distributive shares of entity income belonging to serviceproviding partners often represent returns on both capital and
labor.
The limited partner exclusion in its current state creates a
SECA tax base that underincludes income from labor in favor of
ensuring that returns on capital are excluded. A material
participation standard would do the opposite. Under such a
standard, the SECA tax base would capture more labor income,
but it would also likely capture some returns on capital. With an
all-or-nothing standard, the question becomes one of policy: which
flavor of income should the self-employment tax regime favor?
To answer this question, one need only look to the historical
foundations of the self-employment tax. Designed to complement
the FICA payroll tax regime and implemented to fund Social
Security—a benefit program designed to replace income from
labor through contributions from laborers—the SECA tax regime
has always been labor-oriented. Given the SECA tax base’s
tendency to severely underinclude labor income,320 revising the
limited partner exclusion standard to favor including labor
income seems most appropriate.
Notwithstanding its limitations, a material participation
standard provides the soundest approach to achieving the limited
partner exclusion’s policy goals in today’s business landscape.
First, a material participation standard would address the salient
318. See supra Part V.B (describing the regulations and offering 500 hours
per year as a threshold for “material participation”).
319. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 850 (explaining that the 1997 proposed
regulations’ material participation test would “adopt an all-or-nothing
approach,” categorizing income “without any mechanism for distinguishing
between remuneration for services rendered and return on capital invested”).
320. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (explaining that less
than half of labor income is included in the SECA tax base).
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criticisms of the current law regarding inconsistent treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers. Such a standard would end reliance
on state law classifications, increasing fairness and consistency at
both the entity choice and ownership classification levels. Next, a
material participation standard would enhance consistency with
related provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Lastly, such a
standard would best align with the original policy goals behind
the Social Security program and the exclusion’s enactment.
A. Increasing Fairness
A material participation standard can be applied consistently
to all unincorporated business forms, placing owners who
“functionally resemble” each other in relation to their entities on
similar footing.321 As a result, prospective businesses would feel
less pressure to select one entity form over another to obtain
favorable self-employment tax treatment for some or all of their
owners.322 Further, this change would eliminate the inconsistent
treatment of owners of the same entity type who have identical
rights but happened to register their businesses in different
states.323 If state law labels no longer matter, then “general
partners” and “limited partners” with equal participation levels
will receive equal tax treatment.324
This change could even increase fairness within a single
business. Consider a nonparticipating investor who agreed to be
designated a “general partner” solely to fulfill creditors’ demands
that someone within the business have unlimited liability. The
current standard penalizes this owner with self-employment tax
liability but permits his co-owners—participating to the same
extent but designated and recognized as “limited partners” by
state law—to escape the tax. A material participation standard

321. Marquis, supra note 209, at 444.
322. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (lamenting these situations).
323. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 859–60 (advocating for adoption of a
uniform standard that does not rely on state law classifications).
324. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 321 (noting that if activity is the
standard, “the labels ‘general partner’ and ‘limited partner’ become
meaningless”).
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would eliminate the penalty on the general partner for making
that business-advancing choice.
Further, a material participation standard tied to number of
hours worked would be easier for tax practitioners and lay
taxpayers to understand and more feasible to apply.325 This
standard would require the same type of recordkeeping that
many individuals already undertake to comply with passive
activity provisions.326 Moreover, in general, such a standard
would not require the taxpayer to make complicated legal
judgments to comply.327 These factors enhance both the likelihood
of compliance and the perceived fairness of the standard.
B. Enhancing Consistency Within the Internal Revenue Code
A material participation standard for § 1402(a)(13) would
also align well with other relevant Code provisions such as
§ 469328—providing passive activity loss rules329—and the new
§ 1411330—implementing the Net Investment Income tax.331 A
term’s meaning need not be consistent across the entire Internal
Revenue Code; often inconsistent meanings can actually better
serve the policy goals Congress envisioned in enacting various
provisions.332 Consistency between the definition of “limited
partner” in § 469 and § 1402(a)(13), however, makes sense given
the two provisions’ similar legislative origins and policy
objectives.333 Because § 1411 relies on the § 469 interpretation of
325. See id. (mentioning that a “minimum hours per year” test would be an
“easy-to-administer, simple, bright-line test”).
326. See infra Part VII.B.1 (discussing the § 469 passive activity rules and
the provision’s material participation standard).
327. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)–2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (Jan. 13,
1997) (recognizing concerns about standards that depend on “legal or factual
determinations that may be difficult for taxpayers or the IRS to make with
certainty”).
328. I.R.C. § 469 (2012).
329. Id.
330. Id. § 1411.
331. Id.
332. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 326 (explaining that the IRS
often assigns meanings provision-by-provision and noting this practice’s
benefits).
333. See Stewart Karlinsky, Self-Employment Taxes and PALs: The Case of
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“limited partner,”334 consistency between § 1402(a)(13) and § 469
will also improve application of § 1411.
1. Section 469
Section 469 imposes limitations on the deductibility of losses.
The provision and related regulations characterize activities as
either “active” or “passive” using a material participation
standard.335 The provision defines “material participation” as
“involve[ment] in the operations of the activity on a basis which is
regular, continuous, and substantial.”336
Generally, the provision permits taxpayers to deduct passive
activity losses only from other passive activity income.337 In
contrast, a taxpayer may use “active” activity losses to
immediately offset taxable income from any other source,
including salary, wages, interest, or other capital gains.338 Losses
disallowed under § 469 carry over to future years and may be
deducted when passive income exists or the taxpayer disposes of
the activity that generated the passive activity loss.339
LLCs, 132 TAX NOTES 1391, 1392, 1394 (Sept. 26, 2011) (asserting that “much of
the Social Security tax gap could be closed” through consistent interpretation of
“limited partner” in § 469 and § 1402 and suggesting that the IRS could use the
“fairly long-settled” passive activity loss regulations “to differentiate passive
earnings from active earnings for net self-employment purposes”); see also N.Y.
STATE BAR ASSOC. TAX SECTION, REP. 1247, COMMENTS ON THE APPLICATION OF
EMPLOYMENT TAXES TO PARTNERS AND ON THE INTERACTION OF THE SECTION 1401
TAX WITH THE NEW SECTION 1411 12 (2011) [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT],
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/12
47report.pdf (recommending adoption of a material participation standard
“analogous to that of Section 469”).
334. See I.R.C. § 1411(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“A trade or business is described in
this paragraph if such trade or business is a passive activity (within the
meaning of section 469) with respect to the taxpayer . . . .” (emphasis added)).
335. See id. § 469(c)(1) (defining “passive activity” as “conduct of a trade or
business” in which the taxpayer “does not materially participate”).
336. Id. § 469(h)(1)(A)–(C).
337. See id. § 469(a)–(c) (explaining the general passive activity loss rule).
338. See id. § 165 (describing the general, nonpassive loss deduction rules);
see also Orly Sulami, Good News in a Bad Economy: Service Acquiesces on ProTaxpayer Application of Passive Activity Loss Rules to Limited Liability
Companies, 65 TAX LAW. 81, 81–82 (2011) (explaining the rule).
339. See I.R.C. § 469(b), (f), (g) (providing the carryover rules).
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Before Congress enacted these rules in 1986, taxpayers
attempted to reduce their tax liability by investing in businesses
that generated tax losses in excess of the investors’ economic
outlays.340 These tax-loss-generating investments—often limited
partnerships—served to shelter income from other sources.341 To
eliminate these tax shelters, Congress drew a dividing line
(similar to the one in § 1402(a)(13)) between “limited partners”
and “general partners” by creating a presumption under
§ 469(h)(2) that limited partners do not materially participate
(making their income per se passive).342 In creating this
presumption, Congress assumed that limited partners held
limited liability and lacked the ability to participate in a
partnership’s management—the same assumptions about limited
partners that colored § 1402(a)(13)’s enactment.343
General partners may satisfy the material participation
standard through one of seven tests outlined in Temporary
Treasury Regulation § 1.469-5T(a).344 Limited partners who do
not also hold general partner interests may use only three of
these tests—considered more stringent—to overcome the
passivity presumption.345 These three tests ask whether the
taxpayer participated in the activity for more than 500 hours
during the taxable year;346 whether he materially participated for

340. See Sulami, supra note 338, at 83 (describing § 469’s history).
341. See id. (explaining Congress’s concern with “taxpayers’ ability to
significantly reduce their tax liability with deductions and credits attributable
to losses that lacked economic reality”).
342. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (2012); see also Sulami, supra note 338, at 85
(explaining the limited partner presumption).
343. See Banoff, Part 1, supra note 129, at 333 (describing the role these
assumptions played in Congress’s § 469 decision-making process); Garnett v.
Comm’r, 132 T.C. 368, 380 (2009) (describing “the legislative belief that
statutory constraints on a limited partner’s ability to participate in the
partnership’s business justified a presumption that a limited partner generally
does not materially participate”).
344. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) (1996) (listing the material
participation tests).
345. See Sulami, supra note 338, at 85–86 (explaining the tests and noting
that a limited partner may not use the “more lenient material participation
tests” available to general partners and other taxpayers).
346. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1).

2442

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2389 (2013)

any five of the preceding ten taxable years;347 or whether the
activity is a “personal service activity.”348
The evolution of unincorporated business entities has created
problems interpreting § 469 similar to those created in the
context of § 1402(a)(13), especially with regard to LLCs. Without
clear statutory or regulatory guidance, most LLC owners (and the
IRS) have taken the position that the limited partner
presumption applies to LLCs.349 Several recent cases, however,
clarified that LLC ownership interests are not presumptively
passive limited partnership interests.350 In response, the
Treasury Department proposed regulations in 2011351 that
remove the passivity presumption for LLC interests. These
regulations “eliminate . . . reliance on limited liability” to
distinguish between limited and general partners for § 469(h)(2)
purposes, looking instead to the taxpayer’s right to participate in
management of the entity.352
If § 1402(a)(13) employed the material participation standard
employed by § 469, taxpayers would lose the incentive to advance
347. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(5).
348. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(6). “Personal service activity” is
defined as an activity that “involves the performance of personal services in (1)
[t]he fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial
science, performing arts, or consulting; or (2) [a]ny other trade or business in
which capital is not a material income-producing factor.” Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.469-5T(d).
349. See Sulami, supra note 338, at 86–88 (describing early applications of
§ 469 to LLCs).
350. See Newell v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1107, at *5–6 (2010) (holding
that a managing LLC member functioned as the “substantial equivalent” of a
general partner, making it inappropriate to apply the limited partner passivity
presumption); Garnett v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 368, 380 (2009) (concluding that
LLC and LLP interest owners may use the seven material participation tests
available to “general partners” for passive activity loss purposes and refusing to
use an owner’s limited liability as a determinative factor); Thompson v. United
States, 87 Fed. Cl. 728, 734–39 (2009) (reading § 469(h)(2) literally to conclude
that the passive presumption applies only to taxpayers recognized by state law
as limited partners).
351. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5(e)(3)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. 72,875 (Nov. 28, 2011).
352. See id. at 72,877 (“Recognizing that the original presumptions
regarding [a limited partner’s participation] are no longer valid . . . and . . .
recognizing the emergence of LLCs, the proposed regulations eliminate the
current regulations’ reliance on limited liability . . . and instead adopt an
approach that relies on [a] partner’s right to participate in the
management . . . .”).
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a literal interpretation of § 469 (that is, that the heightened
participation standards imposed on limited partners are applied
only to taxpayers who are limited partners in a state law limited
partnership) while at the same time advancing a nonliteral,
functional interpretation of § 1402(a)(13) (that is, that the limited
partner exclusion should extend beyond those having the formal
title of limited partner to any owner who has limited liability
under state law).353 If the IRS finalizes the § 469 proposed
regulations without issuing corresponding interpretive guidance
for § 1402(a)(13), an LLC member could easily have “the best of
both worlds”—the ability to deduct LLC losses against
nonpassive income under the passive activity loss rules and avoid
self-employment taxes through the limited partner exclusion.354
As Orly Sulami notes, “[t]his ability of investors to inconsistently
apply and benefit from the definition of ‘limited partner’ comes at
the expense of the Treasury Department.”355 Sulami also argues
that the IRS, “aware of the detrimental effects of recent case law”
issued the proposed passive loss regulations to “help mitigate this
dichotomy.”356
2. Section 1411
The material participation standard would also dovetail
nicely with the new Affordable Care Act taxes. As Part II.C
explains, § 1411 imposes the NII tax on income from “passive”
activities, as defined under § 469. Consistency between § 469 and
§ 1402 would enable taxpayers to better identify income subject
to the NII and nonpassive income instead subject to the Medicare
surtax. A consistent standard would also prevent taxpayers from
calling income “active” to avoid the NII tax but “limited partnerlike” to avoid the self-employment tax.357 As Keatinge notes,
353. See Karlinsky, supra note 333, at 1392 (asking whether “what’s good for
the goose (the taxpayer avoiding Section 469)” is “also good for the gander (the
taxpayer subject to the self-employment tax under Section 1402)”).
354. Sulami, supra note 338, at 106–07.
355. Id. at 107.
356. Id.
357. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 333, at 21 (arguing that a material
participation standard “would generally require taxpayers to take consistent tax
positions with respect to Section 1402, the passive loss rules of Section 469, and
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current limited partner exclusion law would allow a limited
partner who actively participates in a business but has no wages
or net earnings from self-employment to avoid the Affordable
Care Act taxes.358
C. Supporting the Self-Employment Tax Regime’s Original Goals
Most important, a material participation standard best
aligns with Social Security’s founding policy premises.
Specifically, a material participation standard will promote
universal participation and will further Congress’s desire to
impose self-employment taxes on labor income.
As Part II.A explains, Social Security’s framers knew the
program would not generate enough revenue to meet its future
obligations unless all workers participated. While the framers
analogized the program to a pension to increase popular support,
they founded Social Security on the belief that the nation as a
whole had a duty to create some measure of economic security for
its citizens.359 Universal participation in Social Security—and
universal participation in its financing system—thus serves both
practical and ideological ends.360 Section 1402(a)(13)’s current
structure permits some taxpayers to opt out of the selfemployment tax regime through entity choice—an option that is
inconsistent with the system’s universal participation goal. A
material participation standard, however, would promote this
historical
objective
by
eliminating
opportunities
for
unincorporated business owners to make such an election.
Next, a material participation standard would promote the
policy goal of funding Social Security through taxes on labor
the new Section 1411 Tax”).
358. See KEATINGE, supra note 273, at 19 (positing this scenario).
359. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress
Reviewing the Broad Objectives and Accomplishments of the Administration
(June 8, 1934), in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
287, 288 (1938) (“We are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation
as a whole through government in order to encourage a greater security for each
individual who composes it.”).
360. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 215 (1983) (describing
how universal participation eliminates the incentive for a worker to shift
occupations to avoid paying employment or self-employment taxes).
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income. When Congress enacted § 1402(a)(13), it stated that it
wanted to exclude earnings that were basically “of an investment
nature” from the self-employment tax base.361 Congress used
limited partners’ limited liability and limited participation as
signs of “investment” income. Because those signs no longer
accurately point to investment income, new indicators are needed
to identify investment income.
Considering that limited liability is a policy choice, designed
to promote investment,362 a person’s limited liability says nothing
about whether income from the associated activity is an
investment. Thus, limited liability should not be the new “signal.”
A person’s participation in managerial decisions, however,
can transform passive “investments” into active ventures.
Participation, like labor, connotes activity, not passivity.363 If
limited partners in 1977 participated in management to the
extent that limited partners in 2013 may participate, it is
doubtful that Congress would have used limited partnership
status as a labor–capital dividing line. By reframing the
interpretive standard to focus solely on participation, the selfemployment tax base can better fulfill Congress’s original intent
to include labor income in the SECA tax base and exclude
“investment” income.
D. Criticisms of a Material Participation Standard
As stated, those who reject a material participation standard
because it lacks a mechanism for a materially participating
owner to exclude a portion of his earnings as return on capital
present a valid concern. Critics of the material participation
standard suggest that a partner’s distributive share of entity
income always represents a return on invested capital.364
361. H. R. REP. NO. 95-702(I), at 11 (1977).
362. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and
the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 90–97 (1985) (noting that “[l]imited
liability . . . has long been explained as a benefit bestowed on investors by the
state” and explaining how limited liability encourages investment).
363. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“participation” as the “act of taking part in something”) (emphasis added).
364. See Fritz, supra note 136, at 850–51 (equating distributive shares of
partnership income with returns on capital).
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But this claim discounts that capital investments in
unincorporated businesses do not generate financial returns in a
vacuum. When a business owner adds labor to capital to generate
income, at least a portion of that income is a return on labor.365
Capital investments—such as buying a building to house a new
store or purchasing a piece of manufacturing equipment to add a
product line—obviously generate returns by increasing a
business’s value. But labor turns the building into a profitgenerating store or calibrates that equipment to manufacture the
new product. If a business owner paid an employee to set up a
new store or set up that machinery, the FICA tax regime would
capture the employee’s income and impose employment taxes.
Under the current interpretation of the limited partner
exclusion, a business owner could perform the identical labor as
that employee, refuse all guaranteed payments for those services,
and keep her return on that labor out of the SECA tax base. This
inconsistent result contributes to the porous nature of the selfemployment tax base.366 The only way to address these “leaks” is
to adopt a standard that is more inclusive of labor income, even if
it means increasing the likelihood that some returns on capital
will be subject to SECA taxes. Given Congress’s willingness to
subject returns on capital to an income tax of a percentage equal
to the Medicare tax through the new NII tax,367 a system that is
slightly overinclusive of capital should not cause great concern.
VIII. Conclusion
Recognizing its limitations, a material participation standard
provides the soundest and most feasible approach to achieving
the limited partner exclusion’s policy goals in today’s business
landscape. The question remains, however, as to who should
365. See supra Part III (explaining how the landscape business owner
combines his labor with capital investments to generate income); see also JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, ADDITIONAL OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE 33–34
(Aug. 3, 2006) (“[L]abor income is also earned by employee-owners of
passthrough entities conducting capital-intensive businesses.”).
366. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (noting that the current
SECA tax base captures less than 50% of labor income).
367. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (describing the 3.8% net
investment income tax and its application to returns on capital).
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adopt the standard and how it should be adopted. Perhaps the
simplest solution would be for the Treasury Department to
initiate the rulemaking process for regulations similar to the ones
proposed in 1997. But, given Congress’s response to the 1997
regulations, especially the Senate resolution expressing concern
that the Treasury had “exceeded its authority,” the Treasury
Department is unlikely to issue regulations without congressional
prompting.
A better solution would be for Congress to incorporate the
material participation standard in the statute by eliminating the
reference to “limited partner” and replacing it with participationfocused language. This solution, however, would likely evoke the
same backlash from the business community that doomed the
1997 regulations. That backlash, coupled with the difficulty of
enacting any revenue increase in today’s political climate, makes
congressional action less likely. Moreover, the fact that Congress
has known about the lost self-employment revenue since the mid1990s but has not acted to address the problem might
demonstrate that Congress is comfortable with lax enforcement of
the provision.
Ad hoc judicial interpretation offers the final means to adopt
a material participation standard. The Tax Court’s laudable
decision in Renkemeyer has created an opportunity for other
courts to reject reliance on state law classifications and interpret
the limited partner exclusion to serve the provision’s original
policy goal. Changing the law through case-by-case judicial
interpretation will not provide taxpayers with guidance as
efficiently or effectively as a legislative resolution, but it may be
the only feasible way to achieve change in this area.

